Transnational pockets of territoriality.

Governing the security of extraction in Katanga (DRC)
Jana Hönke: Transnational pockets of territoriality. Governing the security of extraction in Katanga (DRC)


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Introduction

This paper investigates the reconfiguration of spatial ordering underneath the facade of state institutions. In the context of an ‘open economy’ regime, this reconfiguration is not about a straightforward deterioration of the state, but rather a transformation of political topographies. Such transformations, however, play out differently in different regions. In Africa, one needs to keep in mind the specific trajectory of modern state formation: states have been a colonial import imposed by force, and empirical statehood has remained limited. What is weakened and transformed is thus very different from the ideal-type Weberian “Anstaltsstaat”. To analyse current rescaling processes and how the “re-articulation of public/private, global/local distinctions and relations” (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009: 12) work, one needs to take off the glasses of state centrisim and be aware of the “multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt 2002) in which broader processes of spatial reordering play out.

For taking off the glasses of state-centrism, I suggest scaling down the level of political analysis from the central state to a comparison of patterns and processes of spatial reordering in particular socio-economic spaces. Drawing on Catherine Boone and Charles Tilly, I assume a relationship between geographies of production and political topographies (Boone 2003, Tilly 1992). From this perspective, urban trading centres, rural zones of cash-crop and enclaves of production provide meaningful units for comparative analysis that can be used to analyse spatial politics not centred a priori on the state. This is particularly pertinent for tracing the continuities and changes of spatial ordering in Africa. Such a perspective can, in turn, lay open the “provincialism” (Chakrabarty 2000) and blind spots in the meta-narrative of (European) territoriality and allow a rethinking of what are old and new phenomena in what is described as a ‘new’ post-Westphalian order. Looking at economic spaces and the companies that dominate them, such as in the case of mining enclaves, points to the continuities and changes in private company governance with and beyond the state and the enmeshment of what is otherwise upheld as distinct spheres of the public and the private.

This paper is a step in the direction of the above outlined research agenda. It analyses the history of company governance in an African extraction enclave, the copper and cobalt mining region of Southern Katanga, DRC. Extraction enclaves such as the Katangese Copperbelt have been integrated in a globalising economy since the beginning of industrial mining in the 19th century. Foreign capital shaped local politics and security governance. The Congolese mining enclave is integrated in a global, hierarchical network of places, a networked extractive economy that cuts across national territories, and within which firms exchange flows of goods, people and investments. It draws local urban commercial and transport

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1 The paper profited greatly from the interdisciplinary research agenda on respacing processes in Africa and critical junctures of globalisation more generally at the University of Leipzig. See in particular Engel/Middell 2005 and the research program of the GKL “Critical Junctures of Globalisation”.

hubs as well as the rural periphery adjacent to the mines into global circuits (Agnew 2002: 118f). Mining regions are in fact transnationalised spaces par excellence in which state-based sovereignty and law, a globalised mode of production, and local polities, norm systems and identities overlap, merge, and get into conflict.

I approach the question of political re-spacing processes in extraction enclaves by tracing how and where Western industrial mining companies have been involved in local ordering to secure extraction. Integrated in a transnational field of extraction, mining regions are nodes of multiple governance interventions. This is not new altogether. The colonial state was built around the pockets of “L’Afrique utile” (Boone 1998), with the help of mining capital. However, the local boundaries of inclusion and exclusion have shifted over time as well as the scope of companies’ security strategies.

I focus on two spatial configurations of company governance. The first is the colonial model. Companies built a territorial, coercive regime of discipline and paternalism with regard to labour in pockets of territorial control, and invested in establishing colonial state rule. The second is a new model that has developed with the resurrection of the Congolese state and industrial mining since 2003, and the investment of larger, more visible mining companies in Katanga, such as Freeport, and the attempt of small-and medium-sized companies to ‘greenwash’ from their past on international financial markets, such as Anvil, and to a lesser extend Ruashi Mining, FQML, and KOL/DCP. From the perspective of companies, they no longer invest in territorial control of labour, as in the colonial model, but in managing security risks by engaging in ordering beyond the fortress of the mine. From the perspective of the state, the new regime is characterised by the indirect ‘discharge’ of local policing, conflict resolution and local development to firms, functions that liberal theories attribute to the state. Local pockets of private governance proliferate in which firms selectively cooperate with INGOs, international organisations, donors, and consultants to manage social order and development.

What makes the ‘new’ topographies of governing security distinctive lies not in the composition of actors - analogies with historical, complex actor constellations abound as shown in the historical comparison - but in the new rationalities and technologies of governance. The new topography is more flexible and combines the fortress-like protection of narrow pockets of production with selective development interventions in communities in the vicinity of the mine to transform them into a kind of ‘protection belt’. Firms see them as integral part of their protection: from local risks such as theft and unrest, but also, and some would argue foremost, from international criticism that would negatively affect shareholder value.

I begin with a brief review of the literature on political topographies and re-spacing processes. I then turn to the case of state and company governance of the copper and cobalt mining area in Katanga, DRC. I trace different configurations of securing production and social order from the arrival of Western companies in the 1890s to the current topography of security governance and extraction in Katanga. I will only briefly survey the developments between the two periods outlined above; first, the governance regime around the nationalised mines during the Mobutu era during which most foreign companies left the DRC, and second, the decline of industrial mining and the integration of Katanga into the transnational war economy of the Congolese wars, during which Katanga was controlled by Kabila and contracts went to small firms and supporters of the AFDL, namely Zimbabwe. In addition to the colonial history, these two periods are essential to understand how the current ‘new’ order is embedded in the historically grown logics of authoritarian rule, predatory patrimonialism and, most recently, the short-term profiteering of the war economy.

I conclude with linking the case study findings back to the literature on political topographies.

See also Reno 2004 and Singer 2003 chapter 2.
‘New’ political topographies

Among others, the historian Charles Maier traces the emergence and decline of modern territoriality. Territoriality refers to a historically specific mode of organizing social control in a “space with a border that allows effective control of public and political life” (Maier 2006: 34, see also Sack 1986). In European history it is linked to the emergence of sovereignty – the linking of political authority or “decision space” to an “identity space” within the bounded territory of states. According to Maier modern territoriality emerged in the 17th century, but became only institutionalised as the dominant form of political ordering in the era of the modern nation state (1870s-1960s) organising political space into sovereign state containers. And although empirically sovereignty varies conceivably between states, as an idea upheld through mutual recognition, state sovereignty has and still does powerfully organise international politics.3

Since the end of the 1970s an ‘explosion of spaces’ (Lefebvre 1978: 290) has been observed, indicating a transformation of the Westphalian, state-based order.4 Others argue that it is more about taking off the glasses of state-centrism that structure(d) political analysis. While the permeability of national containers and the importance of the local and the transnational political scale can hardly be denied, these observations receive different interpretations. Whereas in the 1990s, the hypothesis of a retreat of the state was emphasised (e.g. Strange 1996), many authors rather argue that we see a transformation of states and governance. The governance literature focuses on new modes of coordination as a means of collective goods provision, for instance through public-private co-governance and self-regulation. The governmentality school focuses on the new modes of exclusion and power inherent in such modes of more market-based governance, and increasingly discusses the impact such ‘new modes’ have on political topographies (e.g. Huxley 2007). From a political economy perspective, these transformations towards a pluralized, more fragmented and market-based governance are set in relation with the globalisation and transformation of capitalist production (Sassen 2006, Jessop 2002). In economic geography, an archipelisation of production is being observed: Clusters – or enclaves - of production are spread across the globe, increasingly detached from the economically “useless” spaces in between. They are integrated in hierarchically structured production networks (for an overview see Hein 200). This engenders re-scaling processes of the political in which the nation state persists, but loses in importance in favour of a re-territorialisation of rule at the local and the regional level (Brenner 1999). Work on such rescaling of decision making arenas points to the emergence of more localised governance.

Many of what is described as new developments in this literature appears in a different light when put to the test of analyses of African politics. While nowhere fully realised, in many parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America, the limited territorial reach of the central state combines with a multiplicity of such parallel, overlapping, and sometimes competing spatial orders and sovereignties since its colonial imposition – overlooked by state-centric analytical frameworks. The idea of domestic sovereignty refers to a particularly demanding and historically specific mode of governance - controlling a bounded space over which ultimate authority and the control of the use of violence is claimed (Agnew 2005). The literature on the practices of states in Africa shows that governments in Africa rely on non-territorial

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3 See for instance Biersteker and Weber 1996. François Bayart’s notion of “extraversion” captures how African governments outsource the provision of external security by relying on their juridical sovereignty as a resource for stabilising domestic power (Bayart 2000).

4 See the multilevel and global governance literature as well as the new medievalism argument in IR (i.e. Friedrichs 2001).

strategies of governance for consolidating the central state’s despotic power in a context of multiple authorities and legal pluralism within a territory. Such “rhizomatic statehood” (Bayart 1989) is built on personalised, asymmetric networks, delegating the rule of sub-national territories to intermediaries (Erdmann and Engel 2007, Mamdani 1996, Schlichte 2005: 115ff.) Instead of penetrating entire (colonial) territories with state institutions, infrastructural power (Mann 1984) has been only selectively developed and sovereignty shared (Boone 2003). Instead of building a detailed, administrative control of bounded space as in the more governmental states of Europe, sporadic, preventive demonstration of despotic, coercive power is exercised to stabilise regimes (Herbst 2000, see also Mbembe 2002).

However, the meta-narrative of nation building and modernisation nevertheless framed the perception of African states in the period from the 90s to the early 1970s. Yet since the 1980s the literature on politics and the state in Africa has changed remarkably, increasingly describing the rise of networked, non-territorial rule. Privatisation and the retreat of the state from the economy were promoted by international donors and financial institutions. But opposed to their underlying neoliberal assumptions, these policies did not ‘free’ African markets from political interference. Instead, they deprived governments from controlling economic revenues whose redistribution had been used to bolster their control over local power centres. The networks of power and social control of the neopatrimonial state contracted and had to reorganise. Contracted personal networks of political elites – at the level of the central state as much as in different localities – reorganised the control of accumulation (e.g. Boone 2007, Clapham 1996). It has been argued that this often took the form of re-embedding African economies in an informal global economy (Bayart et al. 1997), an argument that is surely valid for the transnational war economy of the DRC.

A new anthropology of politics in Africa describes multiple political authorities and non-state sovereignties, and highlights their historical continuities (Hansen and Stepputat 2006, Gupta and Ferguson 1997, Roitman 2001). Yet ‘de facto sovereignty’ (Hansen and Stepputat 2005) in many African spaces is not only pluralised, lying with different actors within the same territory, it is also transnationalised. Economic and political policies of foreign governments, companies, international financial organisations and donor countries shape local governance. Transnational regulatory fields have evolved such as the legal field (Cutler 2003). Similarly, development, security, and conflict management interventions directly transport advanced liberal rationalities and technologies of governance into ‘the postcolony’ (Mbembe 2001; see also Gupta 1998, Callaghy et al. 2001, Murray Li 2007, Autesserre 2008, Bachmann and Hönke 2010).

Interveners are not only missionaries and government agencies, so far mainly studied in the literature, but also multinational companies. The industrial mining enclaves in Katanga are ‘critical junctures of globalisation’ (Engel and Middell 2005); ‘glocal’ spaces that are shaped by different spatial orders, norms and sovereignties. The sovereign state as idea and practice, the rules of a hierarchical network of economic spaces and of the broader transnational policy fields concerned with extractive industries, and local non-state polities coexist, and sometimes reinforce, sometimes compromise each other.

**Governing security in enclaves of extraction**

So far, corporate security strategies have been studied with regard to the commodification of security, focussing on the power of private security companies (e.g. Leander 2005). Few studies have examined security practices of corporations not specialised in security, such as those of the extractive industries, and how they affect local social and political topographies. In the following I trace how
political topography and governance rationalities have played out in a specific sub-national space, the Katangese mining areas. But before I begin with the case analysis, I briefly review the literature on companies’ security strategies for arguments how they affect local political topographies.

A first argument is that zones of industrial extraction are nodes of governance and strong state presence (Boone 1998). The control of production and rents in the latter case are easier to monopolise and mostly accrue to governments (Auty 2006; Snyder 2006). A second strand of argument emphasises that political hegemony in most African states hinges on the control of accumulation and redistribution. Ruling elites thus seek to restrict access to the economic sphere to prevent the development of potentially competing power centres. The “rapport privilégié du pouvoir à l’accumulation” (Bayart 1989: 123) makes foreign oil and mining companies a privileged partner as they tend to bolster the position of governments in domestic power struggles. Multinational companies in turn prefer striking deals with sovereign home or host governments directly, as to guarantee a minimum of legal security for their investments (Reno 2001, 2004). The rentier state literature argues that by sustaining the revenue basis of a regime through resource and geopolitical rents, oil and mining companies provide governments with the resources for distributing benefits to strategic groups and allies, and for investing in coercive capacities of the state (Beblawi and Luciani 1987, Ross 1999).

Whereas the political economy literature remains focussed on company-government relations at the level of the central state, recently, interest in the local governance role of firms has grown. Yet the topic is approached from two very different angles. The first has its roots in the IR debate about global governance, norm diffusion and private authority. It focuses on normatively well-intentioned self-governance and business contributions to improved local security governance as a collective good (e.g. Feil et al. 2009). This perspective lacks attention for the political economy described above and the intimate and, at the same time, uneasy relationship of transnationally-networked extraction with state sovereignty and emerging transnational norms.

Others in area studies, anthropology and IR have begun to provide local analyses of the glocal governance nodes in African extraction enclaves and of the emergence of local assemblages of governing security in these localities that transcend state-company arrangements described in the rentier state logic. First, authors describe a pluralisation and transnationalisation of local security governance in extraction enclaves (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009, Avant and Haufler 2009, Frynas 2001). At the same time, studies show that the security of extraction is usually governed in a pocket of strong empirical statehood. Yet this hardly means that they were directly controlled by government, but rather in cooperation with external companies. The scope of different authorities is hard to define and even harder are they disentangled (ibid., Ferguson 2006, Soares de Oliveira 2007). It has been assumed that the global market of security services has made companies more independent from local political (dis)order and the actual capacity of host states to provide physical security effectively (Ferguson 2005, Abrahamsen/Williams 2009). I will show, that mining enclaves remain a pocket of company and state governance, and that the degree of the assumed new autonomy of foreign companies is very limited, in particular in the DRC.

Most studies concentrate on disentangling plural, supposedly new actor constellations, and the scope of company governance. Few studies have analysed the changing mode of company governance interventions over time. Yet, some have began to analyse the recent changes and contradictions in how (in)security is being perceived and addressed by companies who have made security governance

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6 Boone distinguishes form and degree of empirical statehood in enclaves of extraction from that in rural zones of commercial farming and cash-crop production, and the vast areas of “Afrique inutile” that remain largely abandoned by the state.

7 See Handley 2008 for a description of the “patrimonial type of state-business relations”.
part of their corporate social responsibility agenda (Zalik 2004, Welker 2009).

I focus in the following on firm’s security governance in Katanga. I understand security governance as “acts of governance directed towards security” (Johnston 2000: 10). These acts encompass effective and ineffective activities directed at producing security – or more correctly, addressing insecurity – in the name of any individual entity or collectivity. I do not provide a rigorous definition that seeks to nail down the fuzzy notion of security, but take the fuzziness of security seriously to comprehend and analyse changing perceptions and how they enable particular strategies and topographies of governance (Valverde 2008: 3). I thus include development and community policies as well as more classical activities of protection, law enforcement, and social ordering.8

Topographies of governing Katanga’s mining enclaves - a short history

The Congo has been described as peripheries without a centre (Pourtier 1997: 22f). The pure size of the DRC, the distribution of the population and zones of increased economic activity concentrated in border zones, and the strength of transnational networks versus limited mobility within the Congo do not recommend territorial strategies of rule. From a spatial perspective, Zaire institutionalised as an „archipelago state“(Tull 2005: 43). In the economic realm, it inherited an outward oriented archipelago economy. Colonial government and companies had invested in islands of ‘useful’ cash crop production, and mining enclaves that they connected with the global economy, with many ‘useless’ spaces in between.9

If Congo is an assemblage of peripheries, Katanga is its periphery par excellence. While it has historically been more autonomous from the central state than other regions, it has been the economic powerhouse and basis of the colonial and post-colonial state’s economic viability (Putzel et al. 2008: 25, 34). In the following I analyse the configuration and scope of company governance and distinguish four phases: first, the public – private partnership of conquering the South of Katanga in the 19th century and the governance of pockets of extraction by coercive paternalism; second, the patrimonial system of the post-independence years, and third, the de-industrialisation and the transnationalisation of extraction in the context of state collapse and the war economy 1998-2003. I look in more detail at the fourth phase, and describe the new regime of discharge and local security management that has developed with the resurgence of formal, private industrial mining and international state building in Katanga since 2005.

8 To trace the shifts in the scope of governing the security of extraction, I apply an analytics of the practices of governance. Practice theories are based in a constructivist ontology and direct my analytical focus to the level of everyday, routinised sayings and doings of governing security, looking at coercive as well as productive forms of power (for a summary see Leander 2008, Hönke 2009b).

9 The persistence of the DRC as a territorial unit is remarkable, but even more so is the idea of a Congolese nation state in the heads of the population, despite the otherwise strong critique and disillusionment with the political elites. Pierre Englebert (2003) argues that the Congo persisted because domestic actors as well as foreign political and economic actors see Congolese sovereignty and integrity as a resource that it is worth to reproduce.
Joint occupation and governance of the pockets of ‘Afrique utile’

In world history the period from 1880 to 1914, and by extension to 1930, represents the first wave of increased global interactions and integration. During the first phase, Southern Katanga was violently brought under control of a joined public-private Belgian administration. From Leopold II the Compagnie du Katanga (CdK) received exclusive buying and selling rights as well as unhindered control over the south of Katanga to open up its copper and cobalt reserves. After the local ruler was overthrown and local chiefs were co-opted,10 the area was put under joint business-state control. The intimate entanglement of Leopold’s colonial aspirations and company interests is nicely captured by the label “état holding” (Vellut 1981, see also Ilunkamba 1984; Vellut 1983; Jewsiewicki 1983; Stengers and Vansina 1985).

Large-scale industrial mining was a driver for the introduction of more direct modes of controlling African territory. Emerging enclaves of mining not only required the mobilisation of international capital to build up industrial infrastructure, they also needed the administration of the rural hinterland to provide access to labour and cheap food supplies (Jewsiewicki 1983: 98). In a limited space, the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, largely owned by Belgian financial capital, and the colonial state built pockets of territorial rule in economic enclaves including a network of urban commercial centres, ports, and railways (Vellut 1983: 146).

The Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK), created in 1906, developed into a ‘state within a state’ (Depelchin 1992).11 Her mode of governing labour changed in the 1920s. The UMHK turned away from the pure extraction of minerals and labour, and the use of forced migrant labour. Rather, the company invested in labour reproduction and increased the depth of governance interventions in the mine-owned city compounds (Peemans 1997: 37).

In the spirit of new technologies of power, which Michel Foucault describes for Europe as the regimes of discipline and biopower, the (re)production of the labour force were made the focus of interventions (Foucault 1976). Colonial state and company governmental interventions intensified, aiming at the production of a permanent class of wage labour (Higginson 1988). In the Congolese Copperbelt, this manifested in a complex system combining control and the disciplinary power of paternal welfare provision. Mining compounds were set up, constituting the colonial version of the “cités ouvrières” that were built in Europe in the 19th century to (re)produce, cater for and control a new, disciplined industrial labour force (Peemann 1997: 37).12 The UMHK’s model of social control was a highly disciplinary regime that sought to change the habits and beliefs of people by introducing modern time management, catholic obedience, and schools – institutions that were at the heart of creating a modern, capitalist work ethos (Fetter 1973). In the new workers’ settlements, two authorities maintained a totalitarian subculture: ‘the compound head, responsible for discipline maintenance, and the [catholic] teacher-preacher responsible for morals and learning’ (Vellut 1983: 156), supported by the authoritarian colonial state administration.

The objective of stabilising and controlling mass labour fostered the further penetration of society by

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10 Msiri, the ruler of the Garenganza kingdom, who controlled the copper trade in Katanga, refused recognising King Leopold’s authority over his land. He was killed by a delegation sent by the CdK (Slade 1962: 134).

11 The UMHK was jointly owned by the CSK, the Belgian Société Générale, the British Tanganyika Concession Limited and other minor shareholders (Ilunkamba 1984).

12 The first labour camps had been built by 1912. The early camps however followed a different rationality. Conditions were extremely bad as companies herded African labour in them needed for constructing the railway and the early mine infrastructure, replacing losses with others recruited by force (Fetter 1976: 35).
governmental interventions of company and state regulation. Until the 1960s, company, colonial state, and the Catholic Church ran a regime of coercive paternalism in extended pockets of the territory: the mines and the labour settlements in their direct vicinity (Fetter 1973). The colonial Belgian state and the CSK provided the security apparatus to enforce the new order, and acted as a tax collector, a punishing agent of last resort who worked closely with the company and the military, which intervened on mine property in the case of labour unrest.

The mines after independence: separatist attempts and authoritarian patrimonialism

Two major books portray Mobutus’ rule during the first ten years as an absolutist regime that centralised power by building vertical, patrimonial networks linking the centre with the peripheries, and by using the structures of the colonial conquest state, namely the military (Callaghy 1984, Young and Turner 1985). The state did not control the vast territory of Zaire. This should, however, not be interpreted as outright weakness. Sustaining social and territorial fragmentation even served as an impediment for cross-regional and cross-ethnic mobilisation against the centre. Not building national communication and transport infrastructure was a political strategy (Tull 2005: 43, Herbst 2000). An extended security apparatus, and support by external states allowed Mobutu to achieve a remarkable stability of his regime until the early 1970s.

After the failed separatist attempt of 1960-63, which Belgian mining capital supported, the urbanised mining area of Southern Katanga became again an archipelago of strong central-state governance after 1966 (Callaghy 1984: 404). The Mobutu government sought ways to reduce the power of the UMHK and to expand the revenue basis of the newly independent state by increasing control of and expanding mineral extraction in Katanga. As in many other newly independent states at the time, the copper and cobalt mines of the UMHK were nationalised in 1966, yet only after an intense battle against the UMHK. The regime also tried to attract new investors (Young and Turner 1985: 288-296). Ilunkamba argues, however, that the nationalisation did not change the colonial model of company governance because the Société Générale largely remained in control of the newly created parastatal Générale des Carrières et Mines (Gecamines). Whereas the company was formally owned by the state, a contract over a “concession de gestion” was signed granting extensive recruitment, production management and commercialisation rights to a subsidiary of the Belgian Société Générale (Ilunkamba 1984, Peeman 1997: 242). Regardless of the struggles over the management of Gecamines, the social regime around the mines remained in the disciplinary-paternalistic framework that had begun in the late 1920s (Rubbers 2006: 117).

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13 As Young and Turner explain, Belgian mining interests in Shaba supported the separatist attempt, but had no leverage in the UN policy arena and found themselves immersed in a political crisis over which they had little influence. Quickly they reoriented and fought with the new regime over its assets (Young and Turner 1985: 364f).
Privatised networks, deindustrialisation, and the emergence of the war economy

Together with the state and industrial mining, the model of extended company governance described above declined from the 1970s onwards. What before had been seen as a state building project, is described now as having deteriorated since the mid-1970s. With the price fall on global minerals markets, low copper prices and privatisation limited the scope of patronage by the central state (Young and Turner 1985, Hesselbein 2007: 36-37). Mobutu’s rule turned increasingly into a predatory and personalised patrimonialism that had difficulties in keeping a hold on competing networks and local interests. Gécamines not only suffered from the crisis of the world copper market, but also from the patrimonialisation of the company from 1980. The company became increasingly used as a major source of revenue nurturing patrimonial networks in the context of declining statehood, without investing in the industry (Young/Turner 1985; Braeckman 1992). Whereas the misappropriation of profits in favour of the presidential circles and a patrimonialisation of the company had taken place earlier, during the 1980s corruption became systematic at all levels within and from outside Gécamines (Rubbers 2006: 119-123). Interviewees described how the principle of “débrouillez-vous”, the principle of “je mange, tu mange” had begun to dominate people’s behaviour. Serious deindustrialisation of the economy occurred after 1990 when the financial situation of Gécamines had declined so much that infrastructure deteriorated and some mines collapsed. Between 1989 and 1994, production levels of copper fell by 99% (Putzel et al. 2008: 9).

Despite these developments, the retreat of the state and the privatization of the economy were externally promoted. Joint venture contracts between Gécamines and international companies were negotiated during 1996-1997 with the Mobutu government, and with Kabila, once he had sized Kinshasa and the Katangese capital Lubumbashi by April 1996 (Englebert 2003: 26-28). Yet the outbreak of the second Congolese war changed the game. Whereas larger companies that were concerned for their reputation and shareholder value withdrew from the DRC, others stayed, engendering a war economy focussed on quick returns from a collapsing state fragmented in several rebel zones. Nest describes how in the government zone companies “...were in some cases persuaded by government officials to persist in organising new ventures” (Nest 2006: 36). Kabila raised military support by offering government shares in Gécamines and other parastatals, in particular to Zimbabwe (Nest 2001; Rubbers 2004: 24-29). Beyond such deals, looting for purely private gains abounded. Kabila and the AFDL were as much involved in looting Congolese resources as the other rebel groups (United Nations 2002; NIZA and IPIS 2006: 33). During this time, local company governance was restricted to the private fortress of the mine, and the securing of transport routes in addition to paying dues to and nurturing political ties with the AFDL and the relevant political-economic network.

As opposed to the regimes of territoriality suggested by Charles Maier, direct private company governance played an important role in Katanga much longer. The UMHK, and later Gecamines governed extended pockets of territorial control – together with the otherwise thinly spread colonial and post-colonial state. However, what Maier calls the beginning of a post-territorial regime and Lefebvre refers to as an explosion of spaces, can also be found in the DRC from the late 1970s onwards. Yet, here it takes place under extremely different presuppositions and with different dynamics than in the consolidated core of capitalist states. After the decline and collapse of the Congolese state and industrial mining in Katanga, it is telling to observe the current attempts to (re)build a Congolese state and a formal mining economy from the fragments of predatory colonial and post-colonial rule and the

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14 Mentioned by several interviewees, see also Rubbers 2006: 123, and Schatzberg 2001 outlining the general principle of the ‘politics of the belly’ (Bayart 1989) that characterises Congolese politics.
war economy. It is telling for understanding the continued close relationship between the transnational networks of capitalist production and exchange, on the one hand, and the idea of the territorial regime of sovereign states, on the other.

**Governing by discharge meets an extended company security management, 2005-2008**

In the context of the re-emergence of the industrial mining economy in Katanga from 2005 to 2008, new patterns of governing security around the mines have emerged. This refers at least to listed, visible mining companies who seek to preserve or rebuild a reputation in formal international markets despite operating in the DRC.

Foreign investment began pouring into Katanga’s mining economy by 2005 when stability increased and presidential elections were in preparation for 2006. Even though the situation remained unstable and insecure, by then external sovereignty of the government was recognised and established, providing for sufficient legal security. Adapting to the new domestic situation and to the international pressure for building a formal open economy, the Kabila government adopted a new preference for foreign industrial investments over extracting revenues from buying firms and artisanal mining, the system that dominated during the wars.

I argue that the new governance regime of industrial mining in Katanga can be interpreted twofold: From the perspective of the government as a way of monopolizing mining revenues at the central state, but also as a new form of discharging local governance, promoting a further ‘archipelisation’ of the state. From the perspective of the firm, new modes of governing the security of extraction became necessary. Large companies extended the postcolonial model, which basically consisted of negotiating and nurturing good relations with national government, to an engagement with new agents at the local and transnational scale.

The resurrection of a network state and the logic of discharge

The Congolese state has been (re)produced – at least as an idea - by international state building efforts, governing domestic elites, and last but not least, large foreign investors concluding enormous deals over mining, oil and infrastructure investments (Englebert 2003). Yet, it has remained a small network of high-level politicians in Kinshasa around Joseph Kabila who control access to and conditions of contracts and pursue their own private commercial interests in Katanga. The government is made up of competing political and economic “elite networks” (United Nations 2002). The ruling fraction around

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15 This section builds in large parts on four months of field research in Katanga in 2007 and 2008. Interviews were conducted with academics, INGOs, consultants and lawyers working on the DRC, mining, and Katanga, as well as with project managers of NGOs, representatives of international organisations and donor organisations, government, in particular from the security sector (PNC, PMH), and operation, security and community managers of the largest foreign-listed industrial mining companies in Katanga, namely Tenke Fungurume Mining / Freeport MacMoRan, Anvil Mining, Ruashi Mining/ Metorex Group, First Quantum Minerals, and KOL / DCP. Interviews have been made anonymous.

16 William Reno shows in several articles how the internationalization of commercial law privileges globally recognised states as commercial interlocutors, regardless of de facto local governance capacities (Reno 2004: 11).
Kabila seeks to slowly recentralise the access to legal and illegal economic revenues in the regions under its control, namely the Katanga mining industry (van Hoyweghen et al. 2002: 381). It thereby does not follow a territorial strategy that would aim at effectively controlling the entire province with the reminders of the rudimentary state administration. Rather, power brokers of Kabila’s network control the provincial government and parts of the mining administration.17

One of the most notorious “political umbrellas” (Global Witness 2006: 42) is Katumba Mwanke, Co-founder of the ruling party, the PPRD, and close advisor to the presidency. He brokered deals with business men such as Dan Gertler, Benny Steinmetz, and Billy Rautenbach over key assets of Gécamines and diamond producer MIBA during the war (Lutundula Commission 2005). His presence on the board of Anvil Mining for several years shows the close link between new investors and the AFDL war economy at the time.18 The UN Panel of Experts named Mwanke as a key player in the plunder of the DRC’s resources so that Kabila took him out of the government commission during peace negotiations. Shortly removed from government, he has held several positions in the two Kabila governments and has been involved in the joint venture deals that sold the remaining assets of Gécamines to private companies.19

Large parts of the literature consider the DRC as a collapsed, failed state. The politics of mining in Katanga shows that such a “failed state” does not disappear, and how institutions not simply vanish, but develop their own lives and purposes down to the lowest level of the administration. In the functional space of Katanga’s mining economy, state agents are omnipresent, but largely pursue private purposes: Members of the territorial Police National Congolese, the Police Minière et Hydrocarbone, the security agencies Agence Nationale de Renseignement (ANR), the Direction Générale de Migration (DGM) as well as from the Congolese army, the FARDC, and the Presidential Guard frequent mining sites, transport routes and border posts.20 An example from the major border post between Katanga and Zambia illustrates, how the reminders of the state apparatus functions according to such a networked logic. State institutions that seem to lack any capacity and a complete failure at the first view are extremely effective, on the second view, in assuring business opportunities for political networks.21

The border post Kasumbalesa, South of Lubumbashi, is the major transit point for copper and cobalt from Katanga. It, however, only contributes 9% of tax revenues to the national budget (Hesselbein 2007: 49). Under the Mobutu regime, the Zambian border posts kept records and provided relatively accurate statistics and tax collection services. The current government fiercely renounces to replace tax collection from the extremely “ineffective” Congolese agents to the Zambian side. The government values an administration “ineffective” in collecting customs, yet extremely effective at channelling the resources of some networks out of the country.22

Too much interest in the real mining economy by media, researchers, and civil society groups is not

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17 Mining licenses are awarded by central government only. In my own interviews as well as in other studies, the involvement of senior politicians close to Kabila in any mining contract, but also in many “illegal” mining and smuggling activities have been affirmed for the period after 2005 (see Global Witness 2006: 42-44, NIZA 2006: 40-43).

18 Broadcast of “The Kilwa Incident”, Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, June 6 2005, including an interview with Bill Turner, CEO of Anvil Mining.


20 Interviews with government, companies, and NGOs in Lubumbashi and Kolwezi 2007 and 2008, see also GW 2006, NIZA 2006. This is recognised as a problem by the government, see RDC 2008). At the end of 2008 a major multi-stakeholder report on the violent involvement of state security forces in artisanal mining in Katanga had just been handed over to the provincial governor.

21 This is similar to Soares de Oliveira’s argument on the “successfully failed [petro] states” in the Gulf of Guinea (2007).

22 Expert interview, October 17 2008, Lubumbashi.
appreciated. During October 2008, a Norwegian media team and a South African journalist got arrested and their passports taken away by the ANR, when they attempted to film an artisanal mining site near Kolwezi. But also interest in the industrial companies is cautiously observed. I myself had problems with the ANR in receiving an official permit for visiting mining sites at Tenke Fungurume and Kolwezi. The ANR is directly responsible to Kinshasa. Sometimes the provincial governor of Katanga, Moishe Katumbi Chapwe, acted more sensitive with regard to the international image. He promotes industrial mining and the processing of minerals in the province, and has declared his support to responsible mining. But despite conflicts with Kinshasa, such as about the 40 % of tax revenues the provinces are supposed to achieve according to the constitution, but which Kinshasa has so far kept for itself, he is an important member of the elite network controlling large parts of legal and illegal revenues from mining. The intimidation of local human rights groups working on artisanal as well as multinational mining companies in Katanga has increased, and the president of the local NGO ASHADO was arrested in July.23

Part of current state building efforts was that international financial institutions have assisted in introducing the structures of a liberal market economy. A new, liberal Mining Code developed by the World Bank was introduced in 2002, providing the legal basis for a new, open-market policy based on foreign direct investment in the mining industry.24 I argue here that the Kabila government has appropriated these neoliberal economic policies for its proper political and economic purposes. From the point of view of the government, foreign firms strengthen its position since they are seen as effectively reviving copper and cobalt extraction without strengthening potential competing power centres (see also Englebert 2003: 27-28). Larger industrial companies thus increase state income and are easier to control and tax. In addition, they take on a number of governance functions at the local level the state can more easily abandon.

Contrary to arguments that interpret the increasing role of private actors in governance as a sign of weakening powers of central state authorities, I claim that the increasing role of corporate entities in security governance in Katanga, and with them of private contract firms, donor institutions and NGOs, can be understood as a new form of indirect governance, of a policy of discharge. The recent literature on the politics of privatisation re-introduced the governance technique of discharge. Max Weber originally used it for describing a technique of rule of weak central states, such as in empires and feudal states that works through the delegation of coercive and extractive authority to local power holders. According to him, outsourcing of governance functions to private agents is a means for consolidating rule over the periphery. With regard to firms, discharge also aims at consolidating the power of the central state, yet works indirectly through the ‘quasi-delegation’ of state functions to companies.25 Shifting the perspective from the state to the practices of securing extraction of industrial mining firms: How do listed companies govern security in a volatile social and political environment, in which central government practically leaves it to the companies to deal with social conflict that erupt at the local level and turn against them?

25 See for a similar use of the concept Hibou 1999.
Extended bubbles of company governance

Multinational firms can hardly avoid the consequences of this indirect discharge of local governance functions in the context of the transnational field of extraction in which they operate since the 1990s. On the one hand, firms are bound to the incumbent regime and nurture close relations with political elites in a rentier state logic. Yet at the same time, many have extended the scope of their local governance interventions beyond the fortress of the mine into adjacent areas. Under a regime of risk management, governmental interventions by firms have not only a greater geographical scope; they have also been transnationalised. International consultancies, INGOs and donor agencies have entered the field of extraction.

Enforcing property rights & managing conflict

The new model of discharge still operates as an indirect mode of governance, but governance functions are now delegate indirectly to private companies. I will illustrate this point by showing that the new investors’ security governance in Katanga after the wars began with occupying the land they nominally owned and defending it against competing interests in the first place. From 2005 large industrial mining companies arrived in Lubumbashi, Likasi and Kolwezi to occupy the mining concessions they had acquired in negotiations with the new central government. It was the companies who actually organized and paid for enforcing the mining rights granted to them by the state against local communities and artisanal miners. In contrast to company governance in the 19th and early 20th century, authority has not been directly delegated to firms by a state. Yet the intentional ‘laissez-faire’ policy by Kinshasa puts firms in the position to privately manage security around its operations.

A serious conflict developed between industrial and artisanal miners. Interviewees speak of a “guerre civile sociale” in South Katanga during 2005-07 that rapidly developed into a regional problem, in particular in the mining town of Kolwezi in the north-east of the regional capital Lubumbashi. Riots escalated and the police called in by the companies intervened violently. The conflict concerned, in particular, the old open pit mines of Gécamines. During and after the wars, deindustrialisation and the rise of a survivalist economy of artisanal extraction went hand in hand. Several 10 000 people live from artisanal mining in Katanga. In Kolwezi, 80 to 90 % of the population live from artisanal mining, including nearly anybody working in the state administration and the security services. Also, former militias and members of the army were heavily involved in the sector, having close links to the various political factions within the government in Kinshasa. Aggravating the problem was the fact that neither the population affected by new greenfield investments, nor the artisanal miners working on...
most Gécamines mines had been consulted, nor had their interests been taken into account in the new partnership agreements between the government, Gécamines, and private companies.29

Companies drew on private security services, contracted consultants and NGOs, and paid state police and military to enforce and protect property rights. In the case of Ruashi Mining or TFM/Freeport, the payment of some compensation and transport to other mining sites was offered. This incentive strategy proved short-sighted as it contributed to the spill-over of the “artisanal problem” to other mining sites. Some companies offered alternative employment in usually two forms. Companies either contract NGOs to put ASM in small business training programs and apprenticeships, or promise to recruit people for low-skilled jobs on the mines. In several cases people complained that such promises had not been kept. More generally, they are extremely limited in their reach, as ten thousands of people lost their jobs. Other firms turn straight away to calling state security forces to suppress protest by artisanal miners or to ‘clean’ their concession at certain points, even though they had in many cases tacitly allowed the illegal exploitation in return for the extortion of illegal taxes.30 But also all the larger, international investors turned to coercive enforcement. TFM/Freeport, for instance, developed with the Police Minière a system of fixed and moving patrols to get the concession under control. Most companies made use of calling in the rapid reaction forces of the police.31

The new form of discharge does not make companies autonomous from the state, as for instance Abrahamsen and Williams (2009) claim. In an archipelago state such as the Congo, there is an unavoidably close entanglement of firms with state security agents in a space that is at the basis of reproducing the political regime. The government is extremely suspicious of any potential private mercenary group and PSCs are thus not allowed to carry arms (de Goede 2008). Therefore, the industry heavily depends on state security forces for any robust operation, such as protection against social unrest and armed patrols. It is part of the strategy of discharge that while nominally the state controls the means of force, companies pay for any services provided by state security forces.32 The de facto privatisation of the police results in the concentration of most capacities of the Police National and the Mining Police around the mines: for patrolling mining concessions, offices and the houses of senior staff of mining companies.33

The joint security governance by commercial firms and state agents in such contexts deepen the commercialisation of state institutions. The partnership has improved the effectiveness of private security provision to clients, such as residential areas of the rich and mining companies, and made it easier for companies to include payments to the police in their formal budgets (de Goede 2008).34

29 Interviews with the NGOs ASHADO, ACIDH, SARW and other observers.
30 For instance at the Etoile mine next to the concession of Ruashi Mining/Metorex, violence against artisanal miners by the trading company Chemaf has been reported. Similar incidents are reported from illegal artisanal sites on concessions of George Forrest company (Int. with local human rights group, October 14 2008, Lubumbashi).
31 Interviews with company general and security managers as well as with members of the police (PMH and PNC) in Lubumbashi, Kolwezi and at Fungurume.
32 In 2003 a formal partnership agreement between the PNC and the private security industry was reached that provided a framework for joint (armed) operations between public and private security providers. With this agreement the police also formally entered the commercial security market on which public security forces now sell protection to private clients similar to PSCs. The money rather goes into the private pockets of police officers than into a general budget of the institution. Rates used to be about 100$/month and alimentation (de Goede 2008, Interviews with PNC and company security managers).
33 Interviews with expert and NGO representatives as well as PMH police officer, November 2008, Kolwezi.
34 This partnership is, however, an uneasy one. To put someone in a position within the state apparatus means in the Congolese context to give the person the opportunity to “eat”, in other words to use state office for private enrichment. In fact, lower ranks are obliged to do so since salaries have not been paid for years. An interviewee concludes: “Ceux qui acceptent le boulot de l’état sont obligés de voler” (Expert interview, October 29 2008, Kinshasa). Thus, the state police
Companies protecting their concessions and offices build little fortresses.\textsuperscript{35} Space is thus selectively privatised and inhibiting access to any mining site deprives thousands of people of their income. Barriers, fences and patrols prohibit access to more and more areas in and around the city.\textsuperscript{36} Selectively enforcing property rights and mining law in favour of the industry aggravates social tensions and asymmetries locally.

\textit{Selective management of social (dis)order in the community belt}

The international political context of companies has changed since the 1990s. Transnational assemblages of production and contestation as well as local social conflict provide a new risk environment (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009). At least large internationally listed firms are much more likely to be watched and criticised for human rights abuses committed in the most remote places. Listed firms that are vulnerable to reputational risk do not only protect fortresses of extraction. They participate in transnational governance initiatives, such as the Voluntary Principles of Security and Human Rights, to give a positive shape to extracting natural resources in partnership with a rentier class of local and central state politicians. Where this is not only on paper, new forms of community engagement have emerged (Zalik 2004, Avant/Haufler 2009, Welker 2009). In terms of topography, I argue that these governmental interventions concentrate in a permeable belt of communities around operations. In this community belt, local governance is transnationalised, as a node of INGOs, donor agencies, PMCs and consultancies work for firms to manage local order and development.

Local social pressure and violence in combination with pressure from INGOs and the proliferation of international voluntary codes contributed to extending security policies to the areas of social development and public relations. In the absence of institutions that would provide local people with alternative income opportunities, and a state that does not redistribute mining revenues nor prevent local conflicts, companies have become the direct target of people’s grievances and expectations. In addition to the frequent violent confrontations with artisanal miners, there are other examples. In Kolwezi, for instance, inhabitants of the former mining town UZK took hostage a security manager of one of the new companies, on whose concession the former labour quarters were located, to put pressure on the company and the major to repair the water supply of the settlement.\textsuperscript{37} The greatest risk at the community level from the companies’ point of view, however, is that local communities might link up with transnational INGOs or media.\textsuperscript{38} Opportunities for transnational litigation are still limited, but have however opened up a new mechanism for local populations to challenge firms (Frynas 2004).

For historical reasons, people in the mining areas do not necessarily draw a distinction between private firms as part of the private and economic sphere, and state agencies as part of the public sphere. A long history of different state-mining partnerships and joint ventures, and the use of their profits for...
patronage always made companies a part of the political realm. As the community relations manager of a larger firm described the situation in the DRC, companies in fact have to take on more and more social functions. As such broader governmental interventions serve a different rational than in the past, the scope and mode of governing in these pockets of intensified private governance is different. Today, they are done in the name of risk management and therefore target selected groups in the flexible space of ‘their mining communities’. Large mining companies that depend on Western capital markets and good reputation combine fortress protection and coercion with a flexible regime of selective development interventions.

In contrast to the comprehensive system of coercive discipline and welfare in companies’ compound system of the early 20th century, and in contrast to the patrimonial function of state-owned Gécamines under Mobutu, companies no longer invest in the reproduction and formation of the labour force. Technological changes in capitalist production made the industry less reliant on mass labour. But also a new, neoliberal governmentality shaped workplace governance from welfare to more competition-based regimes, putting the responsibility of reproduction on individuals (Jessop 2002). In Katanga this is reflected in the run-down state of the old workers’ cities and the fact that the new investors have not shown any interest in reviving them.

Whereas the disciplinary regime of coercive paternalism wanted to comprehensively transform identities and bodies and was therefore based on a territorial strategy of compound rule, James Ferguson argues that mining companies have now become more “oil-like” (Ferguson 2006: 204) as production depends even less on local conditions and could now be cut off more easily from the social environment. And yet, in Katanga mining has not become an off-shore business, and the community conflicts around the oil platforms and pipelines in the swamps of the Niger Delta show that with the exception of off-shore operations, industries cannot isolate themselves from the social and political environment in which they intervene. The focus of company security governance has become to pre-emptively govern security risks such as potential instability, physical threats and reputational risks emanating from the communities next to the mines, and those dislocated by industrial mining. Criminologists have termed this larger trend in policing “actuarial risk management” (O’Malley 1996). It draws on prevention and surveillance, acts on risk profiles, and seeks to activate private citizens for security purposes. Companies therefore refer to these communities ambiguously as most immediate threat and potential belt of protection at the same time.

Larger firms have developed new, integrated security and development strategies to respond to these challenges and adopted global models of new modes of governing security and adapted them to the specific situation Katanga. A security manager of a mining group working in the DRC explained that:

“Security is evolved off the years and many people think […], see security as a main guarding function, iron gates, security an office complex or mine complex against theft or wrongdoing. Some people even extend that to situations you see across many African countries in the last 10 or 20 years, how we get the ex-patriots out of the countries, when the place goes horribly wrong. In a more broad complex, certainly the industry is involved in the last 10 years. …security moved on. It’s much more of a risk management role we now fulfil.”

At the core of such an “advanced model of risk management” of one company is a trend towards the creation of a joint unit, combining security, social development, and public relations departments in a single department. According to the local experience of its manager, people in Katanga function

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39 Interview with community and conflict manager of a mining company, October 3 2007, Johannesburg.
40 Interview with mining group security manager, October 26 2007, Ndola, Zambia.
According to a culture of ‘palaver’ and value direct material benefits they want to see from companies. As ‘your communities’ are sometimes your greatest risk both to physical security and reputation, he thus puts emphasis on soft modes of managing potential threats and grievances by engaging with communities. At another mine in the hinterland of Lubumbashi, the manager describes that through a dialogue with the communities and education the company tries to make people accept the company as “patrimoine de leur environment” which they want to protect. The idea is to make the poor village communities partners of the company. Once they come to see their own prosperity linked to that of the company, they should put social sanctions on theft from the mine and denounce intruders, even from their own villages.

Several security managers describe how they divide the area around their mines in zones of high, medium, and low risk and choose instruments of protection and prevention accordingly. Strategically placed development projects in the communities in the immediate environment of mine operations are used as short-term and long-term measures of governing potential security risks. This comprises providing for regular consultation with communities and selected development projects in the neighbouring former Gécamines settlements as well as in villages. As one mechanism, companies introduced liaison officers in each of the settlements, who are hoped to resolve potential conflicts in advance through communication, and to provide the company with intelligence so that they are better aware of risks and can be prepared in advance against potential trouble. Another mitigating strategy is to invest in conflict prevention projects. Freeport and Anvil Mining have contracted Pact Congo, a local branch of the American INGO Pact, to work with artisanal miners and run, for instance, small business projects to create alternative income opportunities.

With regard to such social investments, further research is needed on the different strategies and effects of private governance on local politics. There is evidence for a mere co-opting of local chiefs who are put on the payroll of the company and receive strategic investments in their jurisdiction in exchange for social peace. It represents an example of the historical continuity of indirect modes of social control. Yet there is also evidence for a new way of engaging with communities that may put local political hierarchies in question. Paid by TFM and Anvil, Pact Congo builds new participatory structures, local development committees, to represent the selected communities vis-à-vis the companies. In this case, questions of authority and legitimacy of company interventions arise and how they relate to existing political and social structures. William Reno argues that companies are conservative forces in the sense that they usually side with those legally in power for legal security (Reno 2004). As a security manager put it: “We are stuck with those who are in power. There is no time lamenting about it. You want that copper? Deal with it!” Yet sometimes this is compromised by a local reality in which others than the externally recognised government or local chief have greater governance capacities, or are even willing to cooperate with business and provide stability.

Finally, local governance is increasingly transnationalised. Freeport, Anvil Mining and others increasingly contract – or even create themselves - NGOs such as PACT or International Alert, and a growing number of consultancies which specialise in corporate social responsibility and extraction. In addition, donor

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41 Interviews with development and security managers of a mining company, November 20 & 21, 2008, Kolwezi.
42 Interview with company social development manager, 15th November 2008, Lubumbashi, DRC.
43 Interviews with several staff of Pact Congo in November 2007 and 2008. PACT is an American NGO that was initially financed by USAID to work with mining companies on community development and conflict prevention. See also http://www.pactworld.org/cs/africa/democratic_republic_of_congo (last accessed May 2009). Interviews with security and community managers of TFM / Freeport, KOL/DCP, and Anvil Mining.
44 See the anthropological study by Marina A. Welker (2009) of the political effects of the mining company Freeport’s community programs in Indonesia. She demonstrates how the company nurtures existing patrimonial networks and sides with the incumbent chiefs representing the old order and stability, against environmental activists.
45 Interview with group security manager, October 26, 2007, Ndola, Zambia.
organisations such as the American and British development departments, USAID and DfID, have made the extractive industries in Katanga a focus of their work in the DRC. USAID initially financed Pact to enter into partnership with the large mining companies to support them in managing social relations. At the height of the price boom on the copper and cobalt markets in 2008, the consultancy branch of Pact had grown with such a pace that the organisation was largely paid by Anvil and TFM. Also, DfID and USAID promote formal development partnerships between the provincial governor, NGOs and companies.\footnote{Interviews with both local representatives in Kinshasa and a conversation in Lubumbashi, when they were in the final steps of signing memorandum of understanding for a Public-Private Development Partnership between DfID and USAID, the provincial governor, and four mining companies at the end of 2008.}

Since the 1990s, large-scale investments have increasingly been made in places perceived as bearing high levels of political and social risks. I have argued that in order to make investments profitable and safe, community and security managers manage volatile social and political conditions in extraction enclaves in a new way. Private governance now reaches out from the fortresses of the protected mine operation into the community belt around it. As opposed to the territorially fixed, disciplinary regime of governing labour described for the first half of the 20th century, however, the topography of this new risk management regime is more flexible and borders fluid.

**Conclusion**

I have suggested in this paper to scale down analysis from the level of the state to particular socio-economic areas in order to comparatively investigate reconfigurations of political topographies. I have argued that macro-changes in governance and political topographies articulate differently in particular regions and socio-economic contexts. This paper has investigated the history of political topographies in one of such units, African extraction enclaves, by looking at the role of large Western companies in governing the security of extraction in the copper and cobalt – mining region of Katanga, DRC.

I have contrasted two models of governing the security of extraction by large multinational companies, the colonial model, and the current model of company governance in Katanga. The colonial governance of extraction was characterised by a partnership of state and capital that jointly occupied and governed Southern Katanga. The mining corporation UMHK developed into a ‘state within a state’ at the local level, yet provided the financial basis for Belgian colonialism. A coercive regime of discipline and paternalism developed from the 1920s. Direct company governance concentrated on the mines and in the labour cities around them. Indirectly, the needs of the mining industry structured state governance. Effective occupation of colonial territories was highly selective: Extended pockets of joint public-private governance developed around ‘l’Afrique utile’, such as the mines. In addition, the state provided the regulatory framework at the macro-level to provide the industry with cheap labour and an orderly environment.

The second model I have analysed developed with the re-emergence of the formal economy in Katanga since 2005. From the perspective of Western companies, company management changed with the global turn to advanced liberalism and the emergence of a transnational field concerned with the politics of extraction. No longer considering caring for social reproduction, companies protect private fortresses of production. Yet, while hiding behind fortress walls, companies surround themselves with
a permeable and flexible ‘protection belt’. Within this zone, companies flexibly cooperate with chiefs, community representatives, NGOs, state agents, and IOs in an attempt to minimise local risks to the physical security of their staff and product as well as to firm reputation. From the perspective of the state, Joseph Kabila used the international efforts of state building and embraced the ‘open economy’ and industrialisation doctrine of the IFIs for centralising the power of his network over the Copperbelt’s mining industry. Foreign companies have an important role in centralising revenues from mining in the hands of government. Increasing state revenues and private gains from the mines consolidate Kabila’s rule. They also reinforce the resurrection of the state by their need for legal security provided by contracts with government. The increasing role of corporate entities in local security governance can, in addition, be understood as a new form of a policy of discharge; the indirect outsourcing of state functions to companies, such as enforcing private property rights and managing social (dis)order, in order to increase stability in the pockets of extraction.

However, against other arguments in the literature, more private governance does not make companies autonomous from the state. The pockets of multi-stakeholder governance around the mines are closely entangled with local political networks. The new regime of risk management overlaps with the rentier state logic of governance that has been characteristic for the postcolonial order of a sovereign state system. The Westphalian system is in decline, and non-state and non-territorial political topographies have become more important. But sovereign governments and large firms are nevertheless knitted together by a mutual interest in economic profit and the requirement of legal security for the large-scale investments in extraction. The Congolese ‘archipelago state’ materialises in Katanga as a dispersed but omnipresent personalised ‘rhizome’ (Bayart), which pervades all areas relevant to mining and merges the economic with the political sphere. The “système Katanga” is deeply rooted in the thinking and practices of not only state agents but an entire society including foreign business. It is a matrix that forcefully structures the field of action of firms. State agents are by no means absent: they are both, another risk factor firms seek to manage, on the one hand, and a partner in repression and enforcing private property rights, on the other.

The case study has shown how the hierarchical networks of global production and a state-based international order reinforce each other. Foreign mining companies reproduce the rentier system and uphold the sovereignty principle for the legal protection of their substantial investments. At the same time the boundaries of the transnational field of extraction have shifted and now include INGOs, activists, donor agencies, and International Organisations. The result is a complex node of governance with co-existing norm systems, discourses and role models.

Further research should look more closely at the pluralised and multilayered fields of governance, but also at their fragmentation and selectivity. First, authors have highlighted a general rise of indirect, activating modes of power in current liberal governance that I have found in the contemporary security management regimes of a number of mining firms in Katanga. Yet, these social engagement strategies merge with direct coercion and structural forms of power. There is a need for closer analysis of these entanglements of corporate social investments and ‘partnership development’ on the one hand, with fortress protection and ‘petro-violence’, as Anna Zalik (2004) has described it for the Niger Delta, on the other. Second, firms obviously have to be able to play different games with regard to their different constituencies within the pluralised field of extraction. Concepts from the anthropology of development interventions, such as the concept of “code switching” (Rottenburg 2002), could help to conceptualise how agents strategically use and play on different discourses in the local arena. Finally, the concept of transnational fields (Leander 2008) could help to bring the description of the plurality

47 Expert Interview, October 29 2008, Kinshasa.
and complexity of overlapping orders in ‘glocal’ fields, such as the one of extraction, a step further. We need tools to describe the asymmetries within such transnationalised, little formalised fields to understand power relations and their historical predecessors and continuities.

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