1. Introduction

Four dichotomies:
(i) Formal vs. functional principles
(ii) Language-specific vs. language-independent principles
(iii) Abstract vs. surface-oriented principles
(iv) Innate principles vs. principles that are learned

Main claims:
(i) An abstract analysis can reveal intriguing patterns in the data that cannot be discovered under a surface-oriented analysis.
(ii) The principles underlying these patterns must be highly general and abstract; but they may be language-specific or language-independent, they may be of a purely formal nature of functionally grounded, and they may be innate or not: These issues are orthogonal.
(iii) A case can be made for abstract, language-independent principles that are ultimately functionally grounded but still innate.

(1) Two case studies:
a. Morphology: The analysis of fusional nominal inflection markers in German and Russian reveals an abstract Iconicity principle.
b. Syntax: The analysis of displacement phenomena in English, Icelandic, Danish, German, and Japanese reveals an abstract Minimality principle.

Observation:
Iconicity and Minimality are both (a) highly abstract, (b) innate (i.e., unlearnable on the basis of empirical evidence alone), (c) language-independent, and (d) ultimately functionally grounded (motivated by computational efficiency).
(Under this view, it is in fact not the case that “strictly speaking, [functional] justifications are irrelevant in a theory that assumes innate constraints”, as Haspelmath (1999) puts it.)

2. Background

Principles and Parameters Theory (Chomsky (1981)ff.):
Core principles are assumed to be abstract, innate, language-specific and not functionally motivated.

(2) Empty Category Principle:
A trace is properly governed (i.e., antecedent-governed or lexically governed).

(3) Superiority effects in English:
   a. (I wonder) who0 t1 bought what2
   b. *(I wonder) what2 who0 bought t1

Assumption:
LF movement of who0 in (3-b) leaves a trace t1 that is neither antecedent-governed nor lexically governed; in contrast, the S-structure trace t1 in (3-a) is antecedent-governed.

The language faculty is optimally designed so as to meet the demands imposed by the semantic (conceptual-intentional) and phonological (more generally, sensorimotor) interfaces: “We need no longer assume that the means of generation of structured expressions are highly articulated and specific to language. We can seriously entertain the possibility that they might be reducible to language-independent principles, whether or not there are homologous elements in other domains. We can, in short, try to sharpen the question of what constitutes a principled explanation for properties of language, and turn to one of the most fundamental questions of the biology of language: To what extent does language approximate an optimal solution to conditions that it must satisfy to be usable at all, given extra-linguistic structural architecture?” [...] We can regard an explanation of properties of language as principled insofar as it can be reduced to properties of the interface systems and general considerations of computational efficiency and the like.” (Chomsky (2004, 7-8)).

Consequence:
Grammatical principles must be motivated by (a) properties of the conceptual-intentional or sensorimotor interfaces, or (b) computational efficiency. Principles like the Empty Category Principle are not motivated in either way, and must be abandoned.

Note:
The potential tension of explicitness and economy, germane to much functionally oriented work, is acknowledged in Chomsky (2004, 10). In the context of motivating the copy theory of movement, Chomsky notes: “If language is optimized for communicative efficiency, we would expect all [copies in a movement chain] to be spelled out: that would overcome many of the filler-gap problems faced by processing models. If language is optimized for satisfaction of interface conditions, with minimal computation, then only one will be spelled out, sharply reducing phonological computation.”

3. Iconicity in Morphology

(4) Iconicity:
Similarity of form implies similarity of function.
Note: In Haspelmath’s (2003) taxonomy involving seven kinds of iconicity, this qualifies as ‘Iconicity as correspondence of markedness/complexity’.

3.1. Pronominal Inflection in German

(5) Pronominal inflection in German:

a. NOM: dieser Tee, diese Milch, diese Gläser
b. ACC: diesen Tee, diese Milch, diese Gläser
c. DAT: diesem Tee, diesem Bier, diesem Milch, diesen Gläsern
d. GEN: dieses Tees, dieses Bieres, dieser Milch, diesen Gläser

P1: Standard paradigm of pronominal inflection in German

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>dies (‘this’)</th>
<th>MASC.SG.</th>
<th>NEUT.SG.</th>
<th>FEM.SG.</th>
<th>PL.</th>
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<td>GEN</td>
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Observation (Wiese (1996, 1999)):
An abstract analysis of pronominal (determiner) inflection in German that relies on a decomposition of case (Jakobson (1962)) and gender/number features (such that natural classes of cases and natural classes of genders/numbers can be formed that inflection markers can refer to) accounts for many instances of syncretism in a systematic way. Moreover, an underlying pattern of iconicity is revealed.

(6) Case features: [±oblique], [±governed] (cf. Bierwisch (1967)):

- NOMINATIVE: [-obl, -gov]
- ACCUSATIVE: [-obl, +gov]
- DATIVE: [+obl, +gov]
- GENITIVE: [-obl, -gov]

(7) Gender and number features:

- MASCULINE: [+masc, -fem]
- FEMININE: [+masc, +fem]
- NEUTER: [+masc, +fem]
- PLURAL: [-masc, -fem]

Note: Wiese calls the decomposed gender and number features [±standard] and [±special] (not [±masc] and [±fem]).

(8) Underspecified paradigm of pronominal inflection markers in German

1. /m/ ← [+masc, +obl, +gov] (DAT.MASC.SG./NEUT.SG.)
2. /n/ ← [+masc, +fem] (GEN.MASC.SG./NEUT.SG.)
3. /l/ ← [+masc, +fem] (DAT.MASC.SG.)
4. /n/ ← [+masc, +gov] (ACC.MASC.SG.)
5. /l/ ← [+masc] (DAT.MASC.SG.)
6. /n/ ← [+obl, +fem] (DAT/GEN.FEM.SG.)
7. /l/ ← [+obl, +gov] (DAT.PL.)
8. /n/ ← [+obl] (GEN.PL.)
9. /l/ ← [ ]

Note:
Competition arises because of underspecification of markers. Choice of the right marker for a given context follows from the Specificity Principle.

(9) Specificity Principle:
For any given fully specified syntactic context, choose the most specific marker that is compatible with it.

a. A marker of Mj is more specific than a marker of Mi if the sets of morpho-syntactic features of Mj are a proper subset of the set of morpho-syntactic features of Mi.

b. If the sets of morpho-syntactic features of two competing markers have the same cardinality, Mj is more specific than Mi if it has higher-ranked features on the hierarchy [+masc] > [+obl] > [+fem] > [+gov].

P2: Interaction of pronominal inflection markers in German

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>dies (‘this’)</th>
<th>MASC.SG.</th>
<th>NEUT.SG.</th>
<th>FEM.SG.</th>
<th>PL.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOM</td>
<td>r\textsuperscript{3}, e\textsuperscript{3}</td>
<td>s\textsuperscript{3}, r\textsuperscript{3}, e\textsuperscript{3}</td>
<td>e\textsuperscript{3}</td>
<td>e\textsuperscript{3}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>n\textsuperscript{3}, r\textsuperscript{3}, e\textsuperscript{3}</td>
<td>s\textsuperscript{3}, n\textsuperscript{3}, r\textsuperscript{3}, e\textsuperscript{3}</td>
<td>e\textsuperscript{3}</td>
<td>e\textsuperscript{3}</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAT</td>
<td>m\textsuperscript{i}, s\textsuperscript{i}, n\textsuperscript{i}, r\textsuperscript{i}, e\textsuperscript{i}</td>
<td>m\textsuperscript{i}, s\textsuperscript{i}, n\textsuperscript{i}, r\textsuperscript{i}, e\textsuperscript{i}</td>
<td>m\textsuperscript{i}, s\textsuperscript{i}, n\textsuperscript{i}, r\textsuperscript{i}, e\textsuperscript{i}</td>
<td>m\textsuperscript{i}, s\textsuperscript{i}, n\textsuperscript{i}, r\textsuperscript{i}, e\textsuperscript{i}</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>r\textsuperscript{i}, r\textsuperscript{i}, e\textsuperscript{i}</td>
<td>s\textsuperscript{i}, r\textsuperscript{i}, r\textsuperscript{i}, e\textsuperscript{i}</td>
<td>r\textsuperscript{i}, r\textsuperscript{i}, e\textsuperscript{i}</td>
<td>r\textsuperscript{i}, r\textsuperscript{i}, e\textsuperscript{i}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observation:
The paradigm of pronominal inflection in German obeys iconicity: Increasing specificity of a marker correlates with increasing phonological weight.

Three blocks in (8):

(i) There are super-heavy markers in the first block: /m/, /n/.
(ii) There are heavy markers in the second block: /l/, /n/.
(iii) There are light markers in the third block: /l/.

Result:

(i) Light markers show up with extremely non-specific feature specifications.
(ii) Heavy markers show up with more specific feature specifications.
(iii) Super-heavy markers show up with highly specific (but still underspecified) feature specifications.
Further observation:
Both the first and the second block contain a nasal and a non-nasal marker each. Choice of nasal or non-nasal marker can also be explained in a general and simple way: The feature [+gov] co-occurs with nasals (/m/, /n/); absence of the feature correlates with non-nasals (/l/, /l/).

3.2. Noun Inflection in Russian

P₅: Standard paradigm(s) of noun inflection in Russian, singular

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iₒ</th>
<th>IIₒ</th>
<th>IIIₒ</th>
<th>IVₒ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOM</td>
<td>Ø</td>
<td>a</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Ø/a</td>
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<td>DAT</td>
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<td>a</td>
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<td>INST</td>
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<td>om</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Observation:
The system of noun inflection in Russian exhibits many instances of syncretism, across cases as well as across inflection classes. Both instances of syncretism can be accounted for by assuming decomposed case and inflection class features that underspecified marker entries can refer to (Müller (2004)).

(10) Case features: [±subject], [±governed], [±oblique]
NOMINATIVE: [±subj,−gov,−obl]
ACCUSATIVE: [−subj,±gov,−obl]
DATIVE: [−subj,±gov,−obl]
GENITIVE: [±subj,±gov,−obl]
INSTRUMENTAL: [±subj,±gov,−obl]
LOCATIVE: [−subj,−gov,−obl]

(11) Inflection class features: [±α], [±β]
I: [±α,−β] zavod(m) (‘factory’)
II: [−α,±β] komnat(i) (‘room’), mužˇcin(m) (‘man’)
III: [−α,−β] tetrad ’j (‘notebook’)
IV: [+α,±β] mest(m) (‘place’)

(12) Underspecified paradigm of singular noun inflection markers in Russian:
1. /oj/ ↔ [−α,+β,+subj,−gov, obl]
2. /om/ ↔ [−α,−β,+subj,−gov, obl]
3. /om/ ↔ [+α,−subj,−gov, obl]
4. /l/ ↔ [−α,+β,−subj,−gov, obl]
5. /l/ ↔ [+α,−subj,−gov, obl]
6. /l/ ↔ [+α,+β,−obl]
7. /om/ ↔ [−β,−obl]
8. /l/ ↔ [−α,−obl]
9. /l/ ↔ [−subj,−gov]
10. /l/ ↔ [ ]

Some assumptions about further operations affecting vocabulary items:
(i) There is a morphophonological rule that realizes /om/ as em after a soft ([−back]) consonant, and as om otherwise.
(ii) There is a morphophonological rule that realizes underlying /oj/ as ej after a [−back] consonant, and as oj otherwise.
(iii) There is a morphophonological rule that realizes underlying /l/ as y after a hard ([+back]) consonant, and as i otherwise.

Note:
The (partially) feature hierarchy relevant for (9-b) is [class] > [case].

P₆: Interaction of noun inflection markers in the singular in Russian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I: [±α,−β]</th>
<th>II: [−α,±β]</th>
<th>III: [−α,−β]</th>
<th>IV: [+α,±β]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOM: [+subj,−gov,−obl]</td>
<td>/Ø/</td>
<td>/l/</td>
<td>/Ø/</td>
<td>/l/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACC: [−subj,−gov,−obl]</td>
<td>/Ø/</td>
<td>/l/</td>
<td>/Ø/</td>
<td>/l/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAT: [−subj,±gov,−obl]</td>
<td>/Ø/</td>
<td>/l/</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEN: [±subj,−gov,−obl]</td>
<td>/l/</td>
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<td>INST: [±subj,−gov,−obl]</td>
<td>/l/</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC: [−subj,−gov,−obl]</td>
<td>/l/</td>
<td>/Ø/</td>
<td>/l/</td>
<td>/Ø/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observation:
Given an abstract analysis based on underspecified markers that is independently motivated (syncretism), the system of Russian noun inflection in the singular reveals a correlation of form and function, i.e., iconicity:
(i) From top to bottom, specificity decreases in (12).
(ii) From top to bottom, sonority increases in (12).

Generalization:
The more specific an inflection marker, the lower its rank on the sonority hierarchy (Hankamer & Aissen (1974)).
(13) Sonority hierarchy status and specificity of markers:

/oj/, /ju/, /om/ > /e/ > /ø/, /Ø/, /i/ > /u/ > /a/

Potential problem 1:
Why should /e/ count as less sonorous than the other vocalic markers?
Solution:
/e/ is in fact usually (except after consonants like /c/, /š/, /ž/) realized as je, which makes this marker quasi-consonantal. This may also partly explain why the syncretism with /e/ is not fully resolved in the present approach.

Potential problem 2:
Why does the null marker /Ø/ occupy an intermediate position with respect to specificity, given that the sonority hierarchy would seem to support an edge position for this marker?
Solution:
Halle (1994) argues that the “null marker” /Ø/ is in fact an abstract yer vowel /Ø/, which is independently motivated in the morphophonology of Russian. Halle argues that an abstract /Ø/ vowel has otherwise the same features as /ø/, there is a general rule that deletes abstract vowels unless they immediately precede a syllable with another abstract vowel (which, of course, they never do if they are inflection markers at the end of a word). Thus, /Ø/ can be assumed to replace the the null marker /Ø/ assumed so far. And, of course, given that /Ø/ has a similar form as /ø/, and given that optimal grammar design maximizes form/function correspondence, we expect it to have a similar function (degree of specificity of insertion context) as well.

Potential problem 3:
Solution:
This might indicate some language-particular variability, or minor imperfections of some of the systems involved here.

Note:
The assumption that the sonority hierarchy plays a role in the system of Russian noun inflection is not new. Shapiro (1969) and Plank (1979) correlate a Jakobsonian hierarchy of cases H_e (nom > inst > gen_2 > loc_2 > acc > dat > gen_1 > loc_1) and a sonority hierarchy H_s (a > o, e, u, i > v, j, m > x); Plank states the following generalization: “The higher-ranked a case is in [H_e], the more sonorous is the set of phonological segments used for its expression.” However, such a surface-oriented correlation can at best be assumed to be true as a weak tendency; it is only under an abstract analysis in terms of underspecified markers that the correlation becomes (near-) perfect, and Plank’s and Shapiro’s basic insight can be properly expressed.

3.3. The Status of Iconicity

Conclusion:
Iconicity restricts the shape of fusional inflectional systems (among other things).

Question:
What kind of principle is Iconicity?

(i) Iconicity as a functional principle:
If the child acquiring an inflectional system knows that the system obeys Iconicity, this drastically restricts the hypothesis space arising under the task of assigning inflection markers to (typically underspecified) specifications of morpho-syntactic features. Thus, Iconicity significantly simplifies the learning of inflectional systems. Hence, a grammar with this principle is computationally more efficient than a grammar without it (economy considerations; cf. Haspelmath (2003)).

(ii) Iconicity as a language-independent principle:
The principle does not refer to language-specific notions.

(iii) Iconicity as an abstract principle:
Under a surface-oriented analysis that refers to fully specified rather than underspecified feature specifications of inflection markers, Iconicity cannot be satisfied by the system of pronominal inflection in German, or by the system of noun inflection in Russian.

(iv) Iconicity as an innate principle:
Of course, Iconicity could be extracted by a child from an inflectional paradigm that it has learned. However, by assumption, the task of Iconicity is to narrow down the number of possible analyses that must be considered by a child acquiring an inflectional system. So, if the principle is to guide acquisition of an inflectional system, it seems that it must be in place before acquisition takes place. This may suggest that the principle is innate. (Iconicity contributes to computational efficiency and thus conforms to economy, but it is not clear whether it can be made to follow from economy considerations entertained by the language learner – there may be many other ways to ensure computational efficiency.)

4. Minimality in Syntax

Note:
For movement dependencies, closeness can be understood in terms of minimality of path length.

(14) Minimality (Chomsky (1993, 1995, 2001); also see Rizzi (1990), Fanselow (1991)):

α can only form a dependency of type δ with β if (a) and (b) hold:

a. β has property δ.
b. There is no γ such that (i) and (ii) hold:
   (i) γ is closer to α than β.
   (ii) γ has property δ.

Note:
For movement dependencies, closeness can be understood in terms of minimality of path length.
(15) **Path** (Pesetsky 1982), Collins (1994), Müller (1998):
   The path from X to Y is the set of categories Z such that (a) and (b) hold:
   a. Z is reflexively dominated by the minimal XP that dominates both X and Y.
   b. Z dominates X or Y.
   The length of a path is determined by its cardinality.

**Observation:**
Minimality has two main consequences:
(i) γ blocks movement of β to α because γ c-commands β.
(ii) γ blocks movement of β to α because γ dominates β.

(16) **Minimality configurations:**
   a. *... β₁ α ... [ ... γ ... [ ... t₁ ... ] ... ] ...
   b. *... β₁ α ... [ γ ... t₁ ... ] ...

4.1. C-Command Effects

**Observation:**
Many cases for which Minimality is relevant involve c-command.

(17) **Wh-movement in English (Superiority):**
   a. (I wonder) who₁ t₁ bought what₂
   b. *(I wonder) what₂ who₁ bought t₁
   c. Whom₁ did John persuade t₁ [ to visit whom₂ ]?
   d. *Whom₂ did John persuade whom₁ [ t₂ to visit t₁ ]?

(18) **Non-pronominal object shift in Icelandic** (Collins & Thráinsson (1996)):
   a. *Ég lána bækurnar₂ ekki Mariú₁ t₂
      I lend the books  not Maria
   b. Ég lána Mariú₁ ekki t₂ bækurnar₂
      I lend Maria  not the books

(19) **Pronominal object shift in Danish** (Vikner (1994)):
   a. *Peter viste den₂ jo Marie₁ t₂
      Peter showed it indeed Marie
   b. Peter viste hende₁ jo t₂ bogen₂
      Peter showed her indeed the book

4.2. Domination Effects

**Observation:**
Some cases for which Minimality is relevant involve domination (Koizumi (1995), Kitahara (1997), Müller (1998), Fitzpatrick (2002)).

(20) **Infinitive scrambling in German** (Fanselow (1991), Haider (1993)):
   a. *(Ich denke) dass [ t₁ zu lesen ]₁ [ das Buch ]₁ keiner t₃ versucht hat
      I think that to read the bookₚ may no-one tried has
   b. *(Ich denke) dass [ das Buch ]₁ zu lesen ]₁ keiner t₃ versucht hat
      I think that the bookₚ no-one tried to read has
   c. *(Ich denke) dass [ das Buch ]₁ [ keiner t₃ zu lesen ]₁ versucht hat
      I think that the bookₚ no-one tried to read has

(21) **Wh-movement across a wh-island in English** (Barss (1986)):
   a. ?[NP Which book about Chomsky ]₁ don’t you know [CP whether to read t₂ ]?
   b. *[NP Which book about t₁ ]₁ don’t you know [CP who, to read t₂ ]?

(22) **Scrambling in Japanese** (Kitahara (1997)):
   a. [ Mary-ga [ sono hon-o ]₁ yonda-to ]₂ Bill-ga [ John-ga t₂ itta-to ]
      Maryₚ that bookₚ read-COMP Billₚ Johnₚ said-COMP
      think fact
   b. *[ Mary-ga t₁ yonda-to ]₁ [ sono hon-o ]₁ John-ga t₂ itta (koto)
      Maryₚ read-COMP that bookₚ Johnₚ said fact

4.3. The Status of Minimality

**Conclusion:**
Minimality provides a unified account of restrictions on movement that emerge in contexts where there is an initial ambiguity in rule application.

**Question:**
What kind of principle is Minimality?

(i) **Minimality as a functional principle:**
Grammars that obey Minimality are computationally efficient, for at least two reasons. From the point of view of economy considerations, shorter dependencies are preferred over longer dependencies. Furthermore, given Minimality, indeterminacies in the application of operations that would otherwise arise are avoided.

(ii) **Minimality as a language-independent principle:**
The principle does not refer to language-specific notions.

(iii) **Minimality as an abstract principle:**
Minimality needs abstract, hierarchical syntactic structure in order to be able to account for data like those in (17)–(22). The principle restricts operations on the derivation; on the surface, it cannot discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate movement dependencies.

(iv) **Minimality as an innate principle:**
It is difficult to see how Minimality can be learned (on the basis of linguistic evidence); the problem is related to the argument for innate principles based on the Poverty of the
4.4. Minimality and Poverty of the Stimulus

Background:
Chomsky assumes that language acquisition would be impossible if there were no innate principles. (‘Plato’s problem: How can we know so much, given that we have so little evidence?’)

(23) Argument from Poverty of the Stimulus (Chomsky (1980, 33-36)):
   a. “My own suspicion is that a central part of what we call ‘learning’ is actually better understood as the growth of cognitive structures along an internally directed course under the triggering and partially shaping effect of the environment.”
   b. “If it were proposed that we ‘make’ our physical constitution, or are ‘taught’ to pass through puberty, or ‘learn’ to have arms rather than wings, no one would take the suggestion very seriously, even in the present state of ignorance concerning the mechanisms involved. Why is this so? Presumably, the reason derives from the vast qualitative difference between the impoverished and unstructured environment, on the one hand, and the highly specific and intricate structures that uniformly develop, on the other. In essence, this is a variant of a classical argument in the theory of knowledge, what we might call ‘the argument from the poverty of the stimulus’.”
   c. “Note that the argument is of course non-demonstrative. It is what is sometimes called an inference to the best explanation, in this case, that what the stimulus lacks is produced by the organism from its inner resources.”

(24) Argument from Poverty of the Stimulus (from Pullum & Scholz (2002, 18)):
   a. Human infants learn their first languages either by data-driven learning or by innately-primed learning.
   b. If human infants acquire their first languages via data-driven learning, then they can never learn anything for which they lack crucial evidence.
   c. But infants do in fact learn things for which they lack crucial evidence.
   d. Thus human infants do not learn their first languages by means of data-driven learning.
   e. Conclusion: Human infants learn their first languages by means of innately-primed learning.

An argument for innately-primed learning based on Poverty of the Stimulus (Chomsky (1971)):

(25) Auxiliary-initial clauses in English, 1:
   a. The dog in the corner is hungry.
   b. Is the dog that is in the corner hungry?

(26) Auxiliary-initial clauses in English, 2:
   a. The dog that is in the corner is hungry.
   b. Is the dog that is in the corner hungry?
   c. *Is the dog that in the corner is hungry?

(27) Principles that might restrict auxiliary fronting:
   a. Front the first auxiliary.
   b. Front the auxiliary in the matrix Infl (the structurally highest auxiliary).

Argument:
(i) The child does not find sentences of the type in (26-b) in the input.
(ii) Still, (27-b) is the ‘acquirendum’, (27-a) is not the rule underlying auxiliary fronting in English (we know this because (26-c) is ungrammatical).
(iii) Therefore, innate knowledge helps the child to find out that (27-b) is correct ((27-b) may or may not be innate as such).

Assumption (i) is untenable: The child has sufficient access to data of this type. In fact, simple four-word sentences exhibit the relevant construction:

(28) a. Is what’s left mine?
   b. *Is what left’s mine?

(i) Most of the statistical evidence given by Pullum and Scholz comes from sources that do not correctly mirror the child’s natural learning environment: Wall Street Journal, the works of Oscar Wilde, etc.
(ii) Only the NINA corpus (CHILDES) cited by Pullum and Scholz provides realistic acquisition data (natural mother-child interaction). However, here they only report counts from one file, “which happens to be the file that has the most number of critical sentences, out of all 56 files.”
(iii) The number of input sentences needed to determine that the (possibly non-first) highest auxiliary is moved is too small anyway. Here is why:

(29) a(*).Like him. (‘I like him.’)
   b. There are two men in the room.

Generalization:
Children have acquired the right auxiliary-inversion rule by 3.2 years. Children acquiring English also stop producing pro-drop sentences (like (29-a)) at roughly the same developmental age. The triggering data for the latter are ‘there’ constructions, which, under at least some theories, are incompatible with the pro-drop property.

Strategy:
Count the ‘there’ sentences in CHILDES files, and compare them with the number of non-first auxiliary inversion sentences. Result: There are much fewer instances of the latter. This shows that these input data do not suffice to rule out the wrong auxiliary
fronting hypothesis.

**Reaction in Scholz & Pullum (2002):**
It is highly unlikely that ‘there’ sentences are incompatible with pro-drop. E.g., Modern Hebrew is a pro-drop language with lexical expletives. And: Pro-drop does to some extent exist in English:

(30) a. Had a talk with the boss this morning.
   b. Got milk?

“Chomsky may have been too generous with the empiricist alternative he was arguing against. Not even the fact that [(26-b)] is grammatical proves that something with the effect of hypothesis [(27-b)] is correct (and the only possibility), hence does not lead to adult knowledge of English. More generally, no amount of positive evidence, ‘exotic’ or not, would suffice. The poverty of the stimulus is thus extreme.” (p. 148).

**Assumption:**
Language acquisition depends on **positive evidence** (well-formed data); pieces of **negative evidence** (ungrammatical data, e.g., in the form of corrections) are ignored by the child and play no role in acquisition.

**Consequence:**
If data of the type in (26-b) are systematically available to the child, this implies that (27-a) is not maintained by the child; but it does not imply that (27-b) is acquired by the child. Alternatively, the child could acquire the (wrong) principles in (31), which are compatible with (26-b) (but not with the negative evidence (26-c)).

(31) **Further principles that might restrict auxiliary fronting:**
   a. Front any auxiliary.
   b. Front any finite auxiliary.

**Reaction in Scholz & Pullum (2002):**
(i) These issues are orthogonal to the main claim in Pullum & Scholz (2002), which concerns Chomsky’s original argument only.
(ii) Apart from that, negative evidence might play a role after all in acquisition.

**Tomasello (2003, 177):**
“Adults […] do respond differently to well-formed and ill-formed child utterances. […] But most theorists do not consider this kind of indirect feedback sufficient to constrain children’s overgeneralization tendencies, as it is far from consistent. It is also not clear that this type of feedback is available to all children learning all languages. Nevertheless, it is still possible that linguistic feedback from adults may play some role – although neither a necessary nor a sufficient role – in constraining children’s overgeneralization tendencies.”

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**Question:**
Can Minimality be learned, given Poverty of the Stimulus?

**Claim:**
Assuming that the child has access to the well-formed data in (17)-(22) (positive evidence), but not to the ill-formed data in (17)-(22) (lack of negative evidence), (32-a) can be learned whereas (32-b) cannot be learned. However, (32-c) is also fully compatible with the empirical evidence. Hence, given that negative evidence is not available, there is no reason why the child should not maintain a superset grammar based on (32-c) and fail to switch to the target grammar based on (32-a): The first grammar generates a superset of the sentences generated by the second grammar. Thus, there is again an extreme case of Poverty of the Stimulus, exactly like the one noted by Lasnik and Uriagereka.

(32) **Three hypotheses:**
   a. Move the matching category that is closest.  
   b. Move the matching category that is most remote.  
   c. Move a matching category.

5. Conclusion

**Main conclusion:**
It seems that the primary dividing line is not form vs. function, language-specific vs. language-independent principles, or innateness vs. learning by experience; it boils down to abstract vs. surface-oriented analysis of grammatical phenomena:
“Usage-based theorists do not search for the most general abstraction possible” (Tomasello (2003, 98)).
“The basic computational ingredients are considerably more abstract” [than, e.g., Ross’s island constraints, or the Specified Subject Condition] (Chomsky (2004, 7)).
References


