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**VIRTUAL AND VISUAL SPACES
FLAUBERT – BORGES – MEIER – TANTANIAN**

0. Introduction to the Problem

I begin with the question of whether it is desirable, necessary, or even possible to set a unified theory of Intermediality or Transmediality. For the moment, I would like to leave this question open and recall that we have seen many remarkable attempts in recent years, at least since the 1980s. Revisiting the most prominent publications of the past 20 years teaches us that, because of the complex interrelation and overlapping of a large variety and diversity of medial strategies and forms of production, the attempt to introduce clear and varied differentiations and functions for inter-/transmedial relations has, in some cases, lead to similar definitions, simply because some terms have similar or identical constituents. Examples include all manner of definitions of Inter- and Transmediality including terms such as “media references” (*Medienbezüge*), “media combination” (*Medienkombination*) and “change of medium (*Medienwechsel*)” (Rajewsky 2002: 18 et seq.). This also includes the mixing of terms coming from literary criticism, such as intertextuality or dialogicity, with those terms that belong to media theory. However, the complexity of the object does not relieve us of the duty, as Hempfer (1973: 16) expressed in the 70’s, to be exact in our terminology: “The object can be as unsystematic as it will, but the description of the unsystematic object must, as scientific terminology, be systematic”.¹

As a consequence: Even if post-modern theory and post-structural theory have not produced apparently a rigorous, “pure” and exclusive theory in comparison with the traditional structuralism – which sacrifices many central and important aspects of a work – today, we must, in taking advantage of scientific and methodological freedom, see to it that dilettantism, hedonism, or indifference – with regard to the use of theories and terminology – do not continue to appear with their current frequency. Theoretical negligence is a reality nowadays, and unfortunately, it is standard practice to use concepts to create terminological mixtures or enunciations that can be used anywhere; for example: “in this case diverse media are quoted in an alienated, playful, and meta-fictional way”. In the field of the structures of communication, strategies and processes are applied without seriously contextualizing and explaining the epistemological and

1 “Das Objekt kann dann so ‘unsystematisch’ sein, wie es will, die Beschreibung des Unsystematischen hat als wissenschaftliche Begriffsbildung systematischer Natur zu sein” (Hempfer 1973: 16).

historical context of the analyzed objects and the transformations and refunctionalizations they have undergone. This has nothing to do with post-modern or post-structural theory. It seems to make no difference whether one analyzes Petrarca, San Juan de La Cruz, Cervantes, Robbe-Grillet, Kahlo, or Flaubert and the *Nouvelle Vague*: The same, or a similar medial paradigm, is used despite the fact that these authors belong to very different epochs as well as epistemological and cultural systems. Such an undifferentiated approach contributes to a great muddle.

This practice, particularly visible in the *Cultural Studies* of North-American provenance, but also now common in the German *Romanistik*, has led to serious arbitrariness and superficiality. It seems that, here, the governing opinion is *anything goes*. In this context, the critique of Rajewsky in her masterly book of 2002 is still very current and relevant namely: concepts, for example, coming from the fields of film, theater, media or literature are used metaphorically and superficially so that cultural objects become a sort of playing field for the interpreter. I think that scientific concepts cannot be easily removed from their historical and theoretical context, nor can they be productive in a non-historical manner. Only the connection between both aspects gives them consistency and legitimization in the context of a deconstruction process. We should therefore not confuse the openness or unmarked character of post-modern and post-structural theory or of deconstructionism with terminological arbitrariness and theoretical negligence.

Beyond all necessity of clearing some areas, aspects, and terms, attempts like that of Rajewsky (2002), and those of Mecke and Roloff (1986, 1999 et seq.), who began their work on the field particularly early – already in the 80s and 90s – were led by the conviction to introduce scientific bases for the field of media and to apply them to concrete cultural objects.

Following Roloff (Mecke/Roloff 1999: 8) and generally agreeing with his position that especially in the unmarked quality of the object and of the term, intermediality broke new ground because it revealed complex undiscovered areas of mixtures of discourses and hybridity, we must take care that systematic analyses must be based on a clear terminology that must, of course, change depending on the context and purpose of the work and the interest of the researcher (*Erkenntnisinteresse*).

Umberto Eco (in Collin 1992) once wrote that we find cases of “*over interpretation*”. We can transfer this critique to the field at large and concede that we have, in some cases, an excess of theory that does not clarify concepts. Indeed, we have cases in which concepts become so complex and unclear that they are no longer useful.

1. Primary Clarifying Observations of Some Main Fields of Media Research: Towards a Simplification and Systematization

1.1 ‘As if’/‘*Als ob*’ Structure: ‘Presence’ or ‘Absence’ of Media

A greatly disputed field in German research is that which I would like to call the ‘*als ob*’ or ‘as if’ structure. This is related to the presence or absence of media objects and

artifacts in a base media object that enters into a relationship with another media object or literary text. I consider this debate a pseudo-problem, or a question that has little to do with the real important phenomena in this field of research. For example, I find it secondary that certain film structures cannot be present in a narrative text due to the different natures of film and literary text, and that such media can therefore only be *imitated* by literature. I think that such a debate, beyond the correct idea that we must be very aware of the status of the reference object we are analyzing, is superfluous because, at all times, all art maintains numerous relationships to other objects of similar and different natures and disciplines. It should be clear that, in a literary text that is using film strategies, the camera, the camera technique, the light, etc., cannot be present and cannot be reproduced in the same way as in a film. It is correct that a narrative zooming can only be a metaphor because the writing can never replace the camera and the zooming objective, but it is also obvious. When we use and transfer such a term from film language to literary text, the crux is not the incomplete character of the reproduction. It is the recodification and refunctionalization of such a technique in order to have the intended effect, the consequences of using media strategies for the construction of meaning, and their importance for gaining new insight into the operating object. We cannot expect a 1:1 equivalency. Media relations are always transgressions of borders, transformations and reinventions of dialogical and hybrid structures.

For this reason, it seems legitimate to me to use terminology from the film repertoire: When we say, the narrator created a zoom perspective, it should be clear that the language is technically not equivalent to driving a zoom canon or lens. I repeat, what is truly important is that the imagery evokes, the construction of visuals, the effect on the reader's perception, the construction of perspective and the change of perception modalities, and the fact that, despite its difference from them, literature has always had the capacity to evoke *and* anticipate new media, and to thoroughly recreate and explore them (often in advance of development in the home context, as cases such as those of Flaubert, Kahlo and Borges prove). Particularly in post-modern culture, we have a great intensity, breadth, and diversity of different dialogical relations, such that this can be considered a paradigmatic characteristic.

The real problems are not some here criticized practices, but the overflowed and unscrupulous excesses that are committed when e.g. literary works are analyzed under a media perspective and they are mutilated in such extent that we cannot recognize them anymore.

1.2 The Evidence of Intertext and Intermedia

The question of the evidence of intermedia in a dialogical exchange – whether related to the Rajewsky's term of “media-references” (*Medienbezüge*), “media combination” (*Medienkombination*) and “change of medium” (*Medienwechsel*; Rajewsky 2002: 15 et seqq., especially 19) – is another highly discussed area. The problem was discussed in the context of intertextuality during the 70s and 80s and in Germany in the 90s. I consider this discussion to be well known, but not yet completely closed or fully dis-

cussed and still current. I will not refer again to this aspect, to which Rajewsky dedicates special attention in her book, but I will limit myself to discuss the problem of marked or unmarked, explicit or implicit, and strong or weak codified intertext or intermedia forms which determine the evidence of the presence or absence of an intertextual relation, an aspect to which Pfister/Broich (1985) did not give a convincing solution or satisfying answer.

It is well known that there are at least two main lines of arguments in this discussion about intertextuality that have been transferred to the intermedial debate: First, we have a structural position, represented by Kristeva (1967, 1968; in spite of the expansion of the concept of text, that nonetheless remains a controlled concept of text); and, by Genette and by some German structuralists, one which emphasizes the structure of the work that has to be decodified by a receptor depending on his cultural competence in order to indicate empirical evidence of the relation between two texts. Second, we have the post-structural position, which is particularly marked by Roland Barthes (*S/Z* 1970) and Michael Riffaterre, and by general post-modern theory. They stress the perspective of the receptor and of his associative capacity to correlate a text-internal enunciation with a text-external enunciation without the imperative of the empirical evidence, using the frame of I. A. Richards' and William Empson's *close reading* theory or the *allegorical reading* of Paul de Man and Derrida's deconstruction theory.

The first position tries hard to give definitions and establish rules for identifying intertexts for every kind of interrelation, reducing speculation (this is the case of Genette), and only to refer to intertextuality in empirically evident cases or for references that can be assumed to be evident. The other position puts emphasize on a sort of "associative echoes" (Barthes *ibid.*).

Both lines of argumentation have advantages and disadvantages: The second post-modern position has the great disadvantage that an interpretation of an intertext based on the associations of the receptor opens the floodgates for arbitrary speculation. The disadvantage of the structural position is that, as a result of rigorous empiricism, it runs the risk of overlooking and excluding implicit intertexts. The advantage of this last position is that we can count on a transparent, comprehensible and scientific process; the advantage of the second line of argumentation lies in its potential for discovery. It seems to me more productive to combine the advantages of both positions by making the different steps of the interpretation process as comprehensible and transparent as possible.

Following this third alternative, there are two ways to assess the presence of intertexts or intermedia: Either they are explicitly present in the text, or they are implicit and we can only deduce their presence from the text itself in combination with external structural indicators or vectors, or from the statements of the author in interrelation with the structure of the text or of the medial-object. Of course, we must be cautious and careful with the opinions of an author about his own work, as we have learned since the Russian formalists, the post-new criticism of Wayne C. Booth in the *Rhetoric of Fiction* from 1963; and since the *nouvelle critique*, German structuralism (particularly that of Titzmann, and the general structuralism of Doležel, for example). An author's statement can neither confirm nor deny an interpretation that is based on a

scientific demarche. Rather, these opinions have to be tested and verified against the structure of the text. Moreover, authors' opinions are highly unreliable and subjective, often insincere, and characterized by feigned or real ignorance or insufficient self-confidence.

Now I would like to show how to analyze and interpret the problem of the evidence for or improbability of intertexts on the basis of some examples:

1. for the risks of relation as an "echo" or of associations;
2. for the risk of overlooking existing intertexts or intermedia because of the perceived lack of proof, or of failing to recognize them due to lack of competence of the interpret; and
3. for the risks associated with unreliable author statements.

Case 1: Inventing or Imagining References

Charles Jencks, one of the world's best-known theorists of post-modern art and architecture, wrote of James Stirling's post-modern State Gallery in Stuttgart (1987: 268-274; here 272) that:

Due to the beauty of, associations with and location of the Rotunda, I naturally thought it had symbolic significance, and that the middle, in which an altar could stand (or in Hadrian's time, at least the king's throne), would be its central point. Stirling obliterated this assumption: "The middle is a storm drain, and the three circles don't represent the Trinity, but rather the cross-section of an electrical cable."

This snappy answer was an amusing rebuff to my question.

[...]

But it shows a problem typical of so much that is Postmodern, that so many centrally designed buildings and places project. [...] What are we to make of [all this heterogeneity]? For while the collage is becoming acceptable as an end in itself, when there is no overarching theme for a building, no focused symbolic program, ornament and formal motifs will only convey to us a confused and incoherent history. (Ibid. 273-274)

The problem of recognizing structures in dialogue and relations and references in the arts in general, but obviously particularly in the post-modern era, lies in the potential – of the nomadic and rhizomatic structure (and no longer only of an "open" structure after Umberto Eco) – that post-modern artists, filmmakers, or authors produce for the interpretation of the addressee, which creates serious difficulty for him.

Stirling's answer here is supported by the structure of his work, and represents a corrective of Jenck's interpretation. He has been lucky enough to interview the architect, and so he has had the chance to correct his incorrect interpretation, the arbitrary result of his knowledge, experience and imagination. Here, we also see a clear case of "over interpretation" and a misguided interpretation in a post-modern manner.

This example shows two aspects of the problem and, at the same time, offers a solution. We have to distinguish two levels of analysis: one is that of typical scientific work, legitimated on the structure of the object, in which the intertext, or the intermedia is explicit, making our interpretation evident and verifiable; the other level is that of a

special interpretation and reception process supported by structural and/or historical external analogies that we must carry out in such a way that our analysis shows what is explicit in the work and what is a supposition coming from our interpretation. In this way, we can connect simultaneously to two frames of logic: one of structuralism and the other of post-structuralism. At the same time, we can avoid extremes of structural rigor and of misleading interpretation of a post-structural openness that manifests as arbitrariness. For diversity and rhizome do not mean chaos, but rather a multiplicity of non-pre-conceived, non-normalized, and non-hierarchical options.

Case 2/1: Borges, the Founder of the Rhizome Theory

In my work about Borges' *œuvre* since 1992, I read "The Aleph" and "The Garden of Forking Paths" as texts that include the first theory and ideas of the rhizome, the web, the hypertext, and the "many-worlds theory". It is not necessary to go into detail in my analysis today (see A. de Toro 2008a, chap. 11).

When I worked with the rhizome theory in these texts, I did not have at that moment such concrete empirical proof that Deleuze/Guattari had quoted Borges or these particular narrations. As with other texts, I developed my analysis on the basis of structural *evident* homologies between the Borges' texts and *Capitalisme et schizophrénie. Mille Plateaux* of Deleuze/Guattari as a result of a *close reading* and an *allegorical reading* between the texts. Later on, Deleuze quoted Borges several times, including "The Garden of Forking Paths" in *Différence et répétition* (1968). This empirical finding, by preparing the actual paper, leaves no room for doubt about this concrete reference. Moreover, Borges' work has been well known among French writers and philosophers since the late 40s. After some ideological reactions from essentialist and conservative literary criticism focusing on Borges' work, this obvious reference has been widely accepted.

Case 2/2: Borges, Pioneer of the Web and of the Hypertext

Concerning the two other references, I was more fortunate, in spite of the equally hostile reactions of the traditional Borges' research, as providence assisted me. In 2003, the founders of the Web published the anthology *The New Media Reader* at MIT, and here they published a list of the authors that had developed the structure of the Web and the Hypertext before it became a technical reality. Borges is quoted as the first to have anticipated the whole system, what he did in the 40s, and the "The Garden of Forking Path" is widely referenced. In this narration, the Web freaks established the four fundamental principles for the construction and the use of the Web: "procedurality", the "active user", "the changing spatiality", and the "encyclopaedic process". On this basis, it is possible to represent the universe and the entire knowledge condensate in a point. This concept is present as allegoric literary representation and per analogy in "The Aleph" and "The Garden of Forking Paths", and we also find it in "The Sand Book".

Case 2/3: Borges, Pioneer of the “Many-Worlds Theory”

Concerning our third and last example, which involves the “many-worlds theory”, my colleague Jürgen Jost, the president of the Max Planck Institute for Mathematics in Leipzig, indicated to me that this theory would be the closest to Borges’ thinking and sent me a book edited by Bryce Seligman DeWitt and Neil Graham in the year 1973 entitled *The Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. A Fundamental Exposition by Hug Everett, III ...* Without this book, again, I would not have been able to show *the empirical* “proof” of my assertions. The book begins with the quotation of a fragment of “The Garden of Forking Paths”. But the comparison with the principles of the “many-worlds theory”, the consideration of the wave theory from the 19th century (from Young 1800; Fresnel 1815; Fraunhofer 1821; Maxwell 1861-1864; Hertz 1888; until Planck 1900), of Einstein’s theory of relativity, be it the particular theory of 1905 or the general theory of 1915, Heisenberg’s quantum mechanics, as well the concept of the “quantum wave of probability” confirm, and that without the quotation from Borges, clearly that this theory has been present from the first page in “The Garden of Forking Paths”. It was clear also that Borges had deep knowledge in this field; of course, in a popular way, as a writer does. I will discuss this in more detail later on.

With these two references, I could ensure that my interpretation was shared by international and outstanding experts.

Case 3: The Unconscious, Denied and Unintended Reference to Borges: The Case of Javier Marías

In *All Souls (Todas las almas)*, Javier Marías *reinvented* the real and mysterious author John Gawsworth (1989: 121-133), who was known as an editor of anthologies, and none of whose work has survived, except for a copy of *Backwaters* from 1932 that came into the narrator’s possession after an odyssey through second-hand bookshops.² That is all the information that the narrator has on Gawsworth. The narrator, a passionate book-hunter and reader of rare books, like Borges was, is intrigued by the lack of information. He sets to work investigating in a labyrinth of names, texts and second-hand bookshops until he finds a photo and a death mask of Gawsworth (*ibid.*: 127/129). He finds out that in 1947, Gawsworth had been appointed administrator of the inheritance of his teacher M.P. Shiel (*ibid.*: 123). He finds the name Gawsworth in a specialized dictionary for horror and fantastic literature (123) that has helped cultivate both genres (*ibid.*:130). Finally, the narrator finds an informant, who leads him to another informant who apparently knows everything about Gawsworth, and whose name remains secret. The second informant mentions a book by Laurence Durell that

2 John Gawsworth was a pseudonym of Terence Ian Fytton Armstrong (another pseudonym was Orpheus Scannel), of a British writer, poet and compiler of anthologies for poetry and short stories. He was the king of Redonda in 1947 and became known as King Juan I.

supposedly contains all of the relevant information on Gawsworth. Gawsworth is said to have been homeless, ruined by alcohol and a collection of “unhealthy books” (“*libros malsanos*”; Mariás 1989: 125)³, and to have died in a hospital in London. The photo and death mask motivate the narrator to deliver a long description of Gawsworth’s appearance.

Rhetoric, style, the conduct of the narrator, and the content of the narration represent an evident analogy to Borges’ short story “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”. Moreover, we find several direct connections to Borges’ short story that hardly can be considered mere coincidence. We have the date 1947, which is both the year in which Gawsworth becomes king of Redonda and the date of the postscript in Borges’ “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”, along with a reference to the *Anthology of Fantastic Literature* of 1940 (1989: 440) that was edited by Silvina Ocampo, Bioy Casares and Borges. Just as Mariás reinvents Gawsworth, Borges invents his Herbert Ashe, a British man of whom Borges possesses a photo that he describes in detail (*ibid.*: 433-434). As Mariás’ narrator receives information about Gawsworth, the narrator tells the secret of Tlön (a planet belonging to the fantastic literature of Uqbar, an unknown region mentioned in the *Anglo-American Cyclopaedia*, invented by Borges) in a letter from a book by Gunnar Erfjord. And so, just as Mariás’ narrator reveals the secret of Gawsworth in Nashville, Tennessee, so does a journalist for *The American* from Nashville, Tennessee who discovers the first encyclopaedia of Tlön in a public Library in Memphis, after which point many objects from Tlön appear in the reality of the narration (photos, the alphabet, books, an Encyclopaedia).

The mixing of the real and the imagined is present in Mariás’ novel, but Borges is much more radical: he makes a world with the language, he creates reality with the literature, he creates a hyperfiction.

I wrote all of this in a catalogue about Mariás for the Frankfurt Book Fair. In an interview with Mariás in the Hotel Atlantic in Hamburg, we spoke about the references I had discovered, which Mariás refused, denying any intertextual relation to Borges’ narration “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”.

Here we have a complex case with many possibilities: Either Mariás denies this reference in the knowledge that he established it, or he unconsciously applied his knowledge about Borges’ literature, or he really didn’t have the short story in mind. Nevertheless, my empirical result is correct. “Empirical” means here only that the parallels of structure and content are evident, even if the author seems to evade them. In such a case, whether a reference contributes something new – represents an amplification and increase of our knowledge about the text – is decisive; more than a mere intertext, it is relevant to the whole construction of meaning. For such interconnections, the question is always what our interpretation consequently gains in value.

3 The term “malsano” (detrimental) books refers distinctly to the owner of an infinite book, in Borges’ “The Book of Sand”, that sickens him: “I felt it was a nightmare thing, an obscene thing, and that it defiled and corrupted reality”. (Borges 2007: 93)

The reference to Borges by Mariás gives us central information about the aesthetic and literary concept of Mariás in the 80s and 90s as autonomous writing with, particularly in this novel, a very clear metafictional character.

The problem of the proof of the existence of intertexts or intermedia is closely related to Rajewsky's terms "media reference", "media combination" and "change of medium". We should therefore address these terms first, but we will do this at a later point in my essay. The issue raised by Rajewsky that "the reader's associatively applied text layers do not automatically constitute an intermedial [or intertextual] reference", and that we therefore do not have "an intermediality understood as a communicative-semiotic process", is so complex that it must be treated separately. For this reason, we want for the moment only to refer to some central aspects in the dispute between Rajewsky and Zander (1985: 180 *passim*).

Let me first state that, unlike Roland Barthes and Michael Riffaterre (1979, 1980), I would not like to speak in terms of an "associative interrelating", as it is no basis for scientific procedure. Barthes (as well as the German textual linguistics), however, tried in the 60s, in the context of the linguistic denotations and connotations, on the basis of clear methods and systematic processes, and through the introduction of the concepts of "nucleus seme" and "contextual seme" to determine them (the denotations and connotations), so as not to leave them open to speculation. Paul de Mans' *allegorical reading*, too, supported by the deconstructionist technique of Derrida and the whole Yale school with such representatives as Geoffrey Hartman, J. Hillis Miller, and Harold Bloom, did not produce interpretation as result of arbitrary association.

In his book *Poststrukturelle Texttheorie und Narrative Praxis* (1973: 56-57) Hempfer denied vehemently that the constitution of the signification of a text can be derived from the reader's activity, as opposed to from the structure of the text, a reaction to the positions of Roland Barthes' *S/Z* and Lotman (1972). The position is surely correct that the structure of the text effectively steers the reader's interpretation of a text (*Lese-Interpretationslenkungsfunktion*) and that for this simple reason, the reader is subordinate to the structure of the text. At the same time, however, it is also right that, working from his cultural competence, the reader can discover new aspects and can do so independently of the author's intention and of the "intention of the text" (in the sense of the Russian formalists). A hardened structuralist, Michael Titzmann (1976) writes that statements about a text can only be accepted, scientifically speaking, if this knowledge is verifiable on the basis of the knowledge of an epoch 'x' or of other early periods 'p' or 'q'. 'Verifiable' can only mean that the interpreter is able to make his interpretation at least plausible.

What we have presented up to now shows clearly that an intertextual or intermedial relation that is not present *expressis verbis* in the text cannot be determined by the reader alone "independent from the strategies for the constitution of the meaning of the text, and from the specific construction of the media product", as Rajewsky (2002: 65) asserts. Rather, it must come from the "intention of the text" as the result of a dynamic, and therefore obviously of a communicative-semiotic interaction process. We have texts like those of Dante, Cervantes, Kafka, or Borges that have an inex-

haustible reservoir of knowledge from which each epoch can derive new and often surprising insight.

Bloom in his *Western Canon* (1994/21995) underlines the non-translatable (or translatable only with great difficulty) and undiscovered aspects of works which are characterized by a “*strangeness*” and that represent

[...] a mode of originality that either cannot be assimilated, or that so assimilates us that we cease to see it as strange [...] Strangeness [is an] uncanny startlement rather than a fulfillment of expectations. [...] their ability to make you feel strange at home [or] of making us at home out of doors, foreign, abroad. (Ibid.: 3)

Such are the “*textes scriptibles*”, open-ended texts about which Barthes speaks in *S/Z*:

Le texte scriptible est un présent perpétuel, sur lequel ne peut se poser aucune parole *con-séquente* [...] le texte scriptible, c'est *nous en train d'écrire* [...] le jeu [...] qui en rabatte sur la pluralité des entrées, l'ouverture des réseaux, l'infini des langages. (Barthes 1970: 11)

Such texts have – according to Bloom – a subversive character: “*The West's greatest writers are subversive of all values, both ours and their own*” (1994/21995: 28), and they have a “*power of contamination*” (1994/21995: 439), meaning that they are exposed to a permanent process of *translatio* and that such a text “*overtly absorbs and then deliberately reflects the entire canonical tradition*” (ibid.: 432).

The knowledge in a work is read in a different way each epoch, and so new aspects are discovered. These discoveries are possible within the horizon of the contemporary knowledge of the reader:

Great writing is always rewriting or revisionism and is founded upon a reading that clears space for the self, or that so works as to reopen old works to our fresh sufferings. The originals are not original, but [...] the inventor knows how to borrow. (Bloom 1994/21995: 10)

Like artists, dramaturges, writers, philosophers, or scientists, authors create their works of bursting originality by reading the work of other authors and committing permanent border transgressions;⁴ in the same way, literary critics and cultural theorists can and should enrich their interpretations with new reading in the context of their time.

It is remarkable that the references or intertexts to Borges that I discovered do not come from literary criticism, but are located outside the relative narrow context of the literary sciences and of the research about Borges work. Had I remained in context of the traditional literary criticism and Borges' criticism, I would never have been able to make visible all of the relations that allowed me to bring a new and particular perspective to the work of Borges (to uncover invisible strata).

For this reason, as I stated at the beginning, the discussion about the concept of intertextuality, now transferred to the concepts of intermediality and of interculturality, multiculturalism and transculturality, should be continued for the theories of hybridity

4 Harold Bloom (1994/21995: 434) considers, for this reason, Borges as the center of his canonical system, and calls him the “the literary metaphysician of the age”.

and transdisciplinarity, as I wrote in 2002. Not only do the cases presented have evident references to other disciplines and media, but they show evident transgressions and hybridizations of literature, media, and other artistic and cultural fields that are not the products of arbitrary speculation (as we will show in detail later).

1.3 Between Diversity and Strictness of Definition: Inter- and Transtextuality, Inter- and Transmediality

Another desideratum since the 80s is not primarily the diversity of terms and definitions, provided one uses terms in a serious and logical manner, even when referencing established metaphors. It is, rather, the mixing of literary and media constructs; for example, the frequently occurring equation of intermediality with intertextuality.

In this context, I find the use of the semiotic term of ‘textuality’ or of ‘intermediality’ in a widely and unspecific form so that they lose their specificity and distinguishing capacity, as superfluous, non-scientific, and very problematic. Some scholars as Müller (1994, 1996) and Zander (1989), among others, subsume the term ‘intermediality’ under the term ‘intertextuality’ during the 80s and 90s, and Zander (1985) leaves no doubt as to the apparently uselessness of the term intermediality.

On the other hand, it is at the very least misleading when all possible forms of expression and representation are understood as intermedial, so that genuine medial and literary constructs can no longer be distinguished from one another, based on the argument that not just literature, but also the writing process and the written word are themselves media, and therefore part of intermediality. Such a simplification and a trivialization of the phenomenon of media clouds basic definitions in communication theory that have been clear since, and that are clear within, Jakobson’s (1960) communication model. One cannot apply today’s multi-purpose concept of intermediality to the “contact media” (novel, film, theater, video, graffiti...). This leads to a reduction in the different forms of media expression or sites of representation. These extreme positions can be compared to the posit of Paul de Man, which is to some extent justified, that it is not productive to speak of autobiography: “*But just as we seem to assert that all texts are autobiographical, we should say that, by the same token, none of them is or can be*” (de Man 1979: 922); where necessary differentiation between types of discourse becomes impossible.

A postmodern deconstructionist or rhizomatic procedure may not mix object- and meta-language to such an extent that the terminology used becomes so confused or diversified that the analysis fails. This branch of research still suffers the effects of this phenomenon today, as deconstruction and rhizome are obviously so misunderstood that *anything goes*, which is not the case according to the works of e.g. Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze. The assumed and alleged “arbitrariness” that traditional scholars impute to post-structuralism in the development of postmodern theory and the supposed and proved lack of scientific stringency is in no way inherent in said development, but rather lies in the imitating epigones’ capacity for implementation. The openness of the terms and theories, for example, must nonetheless be clearly delineated for their momentary use, or they will only serve to confuse.

It seems to me inappropriate not only to equate Bachtin's principle of dialogization with Kristeva's intertextual term, as they do not cover the same field, but also to equate the literature-based intertextual term with the intermedial one, as Rajewsky correctly asserts.

Bachtin's *text-internal* subject oriented dialogization is not the same as Kristeva's (1967) *text-external* intertextuality, supposedly practiced without a subject. The fact that Kristeva distances herself from the prominent function of the author's presence and replaces this figure with numerous intertexts means, in the context of communication theory, an extension of attention from unanimity to a plurality behind every component of which a subject is to be found, and not the elimination of unanimity. There is no intertext without a subject. And even when it is apparently invisible, it must be presupposed, as is common in semiotics, pragma-semiotics, and the *speech act theory*. Anything else is speaking in metaphors (cf. Dirscherl 1975).

This discussion moves between the separation or mixing of the terms intertextuality and intermediality; between the restriction or expansion of these terms as well as the term 'text', although not as Rajewsky (2002: 48) sees in Pfister (1985) between a broadly – or narrowly – constructed term 'text'; and I see no problem in this. For one must assume that (literary) texts never come about without textual references, so that it is just to consider that the literature or textuality concepts are fundamentally intertextual. And, of course, we have to consider that the practice of intertextuality will be different from one text or one author to another, or from one epoch to another, and that this practice will be conscious or unconscious, intensive or less intensive, and will alter conceptuality and application in the functions and semantic constitutions or constellations of the references used.

The terms suggested by Rajewsky following Hempfer (2001) are also largely complex and very similar in their effects: first, we have the "single reference", defined as "intertextuality" and so understood as the "reference of a text to a single or multiple texts" as well as second "system reference", defined as "the relation of a text to semiotic systems like genres or types of discourse" that she develops into a system or theory of intertextuality.

In their differentiation, the terms encompass one another. When a 20th century novel, such as those of the European Avant-Garde, refers to a dramatic work, let us say to classicism, to a tragedy, this is simultaneously a single reference and a threefold system reference: to the category of drama, to the subcategory of tragedy, and to the culture system of the classic. Genette demonstrated this clearly in his model of intertextuality. Of course, cases also arise in which a novel references another novel, in which case it also references a system of categorization of an entire epoch, even if the whole thing stays within the one genre. I could give any one of a number of examples, such as how Balzac's *Le père Goriot* builds on the system of drama and that of tragedy on the basis of passion, organized with its *exposition*, *développement*, *noue* and *dé-nouement* and reaching back to Dante's *Divina Commedia*, which is also a text, but which belongs to an entirely different category.

1.4 “*Influence*” or Junctures (Interferences): “Media Combination” of “Media Reference” and “Change of Medium”

Whether film “*influences*” literature, theater, and the fine arts, or whether philosophy and the natural sciences “*influence*” literature, theater, or the fine arts, or vice-versa, and whether such influence or references must be proven seems to me not only a strenuous, but also wholly unproductive discussion, especially in such obvious cases as Dos Passos or Faulkner, Robbe-Grillet or Vargas Llosa, Flaubert or Borges. The fact is that literature, art, media, and science have always had an interactive relationship. Consider the role of physics and optical refraction on 19th century Impressionism, or that of psychoanalysis of the early 20th century on literature, theater, and art on the whole. Dieter Daniels (2002: chapter 3) shows convincingly how, for example, the introduction of the telegraph influences the painting of Manet’s, the four versions of the image of the shooting of Kaiser Maximilian (which can be traced back to Goya’s *The Third of May 1808* (1814)) as the regular messages traveling via the telegraph wires that had just been laid between the USA and Europe indicate. Such reciprocal effects are not just common, but represent the rule.

Certain critical comments should be added with regard to the concepts of “combination of media”, “media reference”, and “change of medium”. It is surely worth the effort to attempt to make a systematic delineation of the carrying over of processes from a medium “x” into a medium “y”, and to cleanly differentiate between the actual and analogous presence or lack of a medium. These three terms are, however, much more permeable and interwoven than Rajewsky admits. I believe that in such cases, one must distinguish between a “theoretical-systematic” level – as Rajewsky herself says – and (I would add) an operative level (ibid.: 63 et seq.).

On the operative level, the largest term here is the “combination of media” because every interaction with media presumes different references when these do not come from the same field (theater referring to theater, film to film, etc.), but represent a partial or whole change of media and a change of media references. These three terms have a causal and reciprocal relation; one is inherently part of the other. In other words, they are part of a common process.

1.5 Clash of Disciplines

Here, we should distinguish between two macro areas: the scientific concept of media from institutes of media science, and from those institutes that also represent cultural studies (I would rather not speak of institutes for cultural sciences, as that would open up another problematic field of relations). Both areas are, as a rule, distinguished by a lack of cooperation, because the institutions of media science obviously see themselves as the genuine scientists in this field.

The Leipzig department of media science, for example,

[...] unites three key points under one roof: media science and media culture, media pedagogy and continued education, and book and media science and economics. In the major course of study, one of these concentrations should be chosen, although a mixture

is also possible. Media science [...] deals with [for example] the aspects of production, product, reception, and aesthetic effect of non-journalistic content and forms of radio and the audio-visual media of film, television, and “multimedia”. (<https://www.kmw.uni-leipzig.de/en/departments/media-studies/profile.html> [20/11/2017])

Then we have a micro area, the dispute within the literary science/cultural studies, which is carried out between traditional literary science and newer literary science oriented toward theory of culture or media science, but is also carried out within intermediality/transmediality research.

Now, the question is: Which media term should we use? Researchers in the literary and cultural sciences seldom deal with the sociological, statistical and technical aspects and specifics of a medium like forms of production, logistics, viewer quotas, and that sort of thing; rather, they deal with their *aesthetic* products. They will object immediately if the Leipzig institute has “aspects of reception and aesthetic effect of non-journalistic content and forms of radio and the audio-visual media of film, television, and “multimedia” in its repertoire and thereby exceeds the boundaries I just mentioned.

And yet: It is clear that the fields of literary science and cultural studies lay emphasis on aesthetic construction and production, and on the aesthetic structure and reception of cultural constructs. It is therefore at least worth considering precisely defining the term “media” itself in order to avoid producing terminological confusion. In this context, I must acknowledge that Rajewsky was once again correct in her criticism of the lax use of this term.

One example of the terminological confusion that is to be avoided is the decided refusal of our institution to establish a course of Romance and Media Studies on the grounds that the expectations for such a course could not be met substantially and professionally by us, but only by the Institute for Communication and Media Studies’ department of Media Studies and Mediaculture.

For this reason, the differentiation, which has not yet been completely carried through, but which is brought forth for discussion today, between traditional, technical, electronic, and statistical media research oriented toward production procedures, processes, and forms of management, media formats, and markers; as well as the “*aesthetic media research*” that concentrates on objects in their aesthetic will and on their artistic constructivity, without neglecting the fact that, in many cases (as in advertisement or when technical resources are used, in theater or film), have boundaries that are often fluid. For this reason, no exact separation is possible.

In the micro area, one complaint has been known for some time, namely that with the advent of cultural studies and intermediality research, the genuine work of literary science was robbed of its foundations (Baßler, Jahraus, Spitzmüller, Voßkam) and that a “rephilologization” needed to be carried out, i.e. *back to the roots*, to the true field of activity of literary science and philology.

On the contrary: we consider inter-/transmediality research since the 90s as an aesthetic highly subversive, hybrid, rhizomatic as well as a transdisciplinary and trans-cultural processes.

If we insist, however, on a traditional, scientific literary analysis (which can surely not be reduced to narrative situation, time and space structure), then we stymie the work's productive diversity.

One can either bring the work of literary science and cultural science into opposition, although this is unproductive, unnecessary, and offers no adequate solution, or focus on crossing boundaries instead of drawing them in the context of a concept of transdisciplinarity and a "transversal science" (A. de Toro 1999, 2004).

Such a suggestion can only be made in the context of theoretical reflection for the purpose of making a set of instruments for analysis and interpretation available if we see science as a diverse, open network of relations, which are composed of lines, grafts, folds, and rhizome; as an exchange, as a path (A. de Toro 1999a), as a hypertext where is possible to connect the interests of literature and media science.

We would still like, however, to take the first step with the term *transdisciplinarity*, understood as the recourse to theories of varying origin, for example to those from the studies of theater, history, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, communication theory and communication science, structuralism, and post-structuralism, and to individual areas and elements of theory that serve object revelation and interpretation.

'Transdisciplinarity' has little in common with conventional comparative interdisciplinarity or its studies and practices, as the methods of these disciplines do not transcend their own disciplines. Rather, their approaches remain within the realm of a specific theory construction. The term 'transdisciplinarity' is dealing with methods in their quality of interrelation and interrationality, or transversality, which approach was developed by Deleuze (1972/1973 and 1980) and used by Welsch (1996) in his strategy of "*transversal reason*". From this point on, a scientific strategy is carried through what I call "transversal science/interpretation" (A. de Toro 1999 and *passim*) which determines the type of interaction with different types of culture texts, objects, and theories, in the sense of the *search* and *interweaving* of different lines composed of *bridges*, *interfaces* and *junctions*. We are concerned here with a *nomadic modus operandi* of transversal relations that are created between different systems as network multiplicities.

This type of 'transversal science/interpretation' does not mean "the end of science" or of rationality, something of which it has been accused in different contexts. Rather, it is located in the "middle" of science itself, not antirational, but "interrational"; not arbitrary, but dedicated absolutely to plurality. It reflects our time not as *hybris*, but as 'hybrid', in that it cannot be categorized according to any nationality or ontology. It is not subjugated to a superstructure, nor to a priori scientific concept (see Welsch 1996). Rather, it is part of a *post theory* (F. de Toro 1999) in the sense of overcoming a nominative and fixed structuralism.

Considering the newer and newest research, I would like to make a suggestion that may seem conservative at first glance, but that at least, I hope, contributes to clarity and places the real problems in this field at the center; and that is also oriented toward simplification, usefulness, and operativity. It is a theory model that

- a) is guided by an interest in certain findings, with components that can only be developed in the context of these;
- b) is based on objects, and in our case, on the construction, particularity, and property of the objects;
- c) delivers general definitions for the networking and interlacing of diverse fields, and at the same time, for specific definitions in the micro-areas.

2. A Hybrid Model for ‘Literarity’ and ‘Mediality’

Besides the constructions sites (*Baustellen*) or problematic fields that I mentioned above, I would like to focus my considerations on a proposition for a hybrid model for ‘literarity’ and ‘mediality’. Here, for evident reasons of space, and with the implicit understanding that the general discussion about intertextuality is more than well known, I will only discuss part of the ‘mediality’-theory and will concentrate on the terms of ‘hybridty’, ‘translatio’, and ‘transmediality’.


At the center of this very provisional model, I place the concept of ‘hybridity’ as an ‘archiconcept’ with the greatest logical-semantic ‘extension’ and ‘intension’ of all textual, medial, and cultural processes. Hybridity includes all kinds of macro-processes in the sense of the movement or course of a cultural object from a context/field ‘x’ to a context/field ‘y’. This always constitutes displacement: a glide, a slip, a slide, and also a migration, a deterritorialization and reterritorialization, a folding and refolding, a grafting, a supplementation of diverse cultural objects, conceptions of subjects, and cultural practices.

Hybridity and hybridization always trigger processes of ‘differance and ‘altarity’’, meaning phenomena that take place exclusively at the interfaces of cultures, genres, discourses, and media. Such processes cannot be reduced to one cultural, textual or medial object or form of representation. These objects resist a strong determination or definition, as well as classification according to overarching structures.

In this respect, dialogical processes of textuality and mediality, or of the interrelation between objects, always involve border transgression of varying intensity, which is why each deterritorialization and reterritorialization inevitably leads to an alteration that, through discourse and media proliferation (*trace*), builds unmarked and autonomous processes and objects that represent not an ‘either or’ (*entweder oder*), but an ‘as well as’ (*sowohl als auch*). For these reasons, hybridity is always the opposite of homogeneity or synthesis. Indeed, hybridity means a contamination and obliteration of traditional processes of production, reception, and perception, of transgression and subversion.

Dialogical processes of single objects (literature, media, art...) or between diverse objects (between literature, media, art, theater, film...) imply not only a movement related to the object artifact (for example, by the transformation of genera), but cultural transformations that can no longer be described in the context of traditional theories of inter- or multiculturalism. Rather, they must be described in the context of transculturalism.

Hybridity and hybridization use diverse strategies and instruments to perform inter- and transtextuality, or inter- and transmediality, the movement and change. Some of those included in our model are ‘translatio’ and ‘transformation’, ‘functions’, and ‘transculturality’.



2.1 ‘Translatio’

If we take as a starting point the idea that every enunciation (be it textual or medial) and every movement constitutes a ‘relinquishing’ (*Entäußerung*), a ‘distortion’, or a ‘warping’ (*Verwindung* and not *Überwindung* = ‘overcoming’) and a ‘dissemination’, then culture exists in a permanent and evident state of ‘*translatio*’.

Under this concept we understand, following my publications from 2002 onward and particularly that of (2006)⁵, all kinds of transformation as results of external relations that lead to ‘refunctionalizations’ and to ‘transcultural changes’.

5 See also “Jenseits von Postmoderne und Postkolonialität” (2002); “Carlos Fuentes, El naranjo”, on “*Hybriditäts- und Translationsstrategien für einen neuen (transversalen) historischen Roman*” (2004c), “Escenificaciones de la hibridez en el discurso de la conquista. Analogía y comparación como estrategias translatólogicas para la construcción de la otredad” (2006).

We prefer the term ‘translatio’ to translation (*Übersetzung, traducción*) because the latter term is historically very charged by and tied to linguistic, semantic and pragmatic aspects of language. These, of course, have major importance, particularly in literature, but do not make up the main and global practice of our work. Translation is just a part of what I call a ‘*translatio-machine*’, understood as a complex of social, cultural, literary, medial, scientific, anthropological, ethnic, philosophical, and historical processes.

The term ‘translatio’ encompasses all of those theories and practices, as well as a large and very diverse number of objects, with central focus on cultural epistemological aspects of transformation, refunctionalization, and transculturalization.

In practice, ‘translatio’ reveals the modalities and the structure of the new object (‘intertext’ or ‘intermedia’) and underlines the fact that even a 1:1 assumption of a structure or element of content constitutes a cultural and semantic deterritorialization, simply by virtue of the conditions of temporal, spacial, and cultural postponement. Repetition, therefore, does not mean reproduction, but implicit difference (see Deleuze 1968) a productive disorder that makes the old-fashioned terms “influence” or “studies of sources” obsolete.

‘Transformation’ refers to concrete changes on the levels of structure, semantics and pragmatics, on the level of representation – and clearly on that of the constitution of the significance – changes, for example, like in theater due to particular concretizations, codifications, productions, and performance modalities, due to the relation of dramatic text to director, dramatic text to performance, reading to reception, or direction to play. For example, one would notice a substantial difference in execution between Shakespeare’s *The Tempest* as performed by a Shakespearian Theatre Company in London in the context of British Shakespearian tradition, and the same piece performed by Peter Brook at the Kampnagelfabrik in Hamburg (1991), in his production taking amateur actors from many different cultures. Similar phenomena include the production of Bob Wilson with a text by Tankred Dorst: *Parzival: Auf der anderen Seite des Sees*, or Wilson’s *The Black Rider* (see A. de Toro 1990, 1995, 2004d).

The result of the process of ‘translatio’ and the following ‘transformations’ is the reinvented and recodified object. Reinvention and recodification are the final empirical and innovative new products.

One of the most important analyses in ‘translatio-research’ is the description of the change of ‘functions’, or the ‘refunctionalization’ of the functions of the text or media referents. We want to define both concepts on the basis of Michael (sic. actually Manfred) Titzmann’s unsurpassable definitions:

Something has a function insofar as it is part (element, relation, part of a structure or of a system) of a higher structure or of a higher system where an entity has a particular position, meaning it exists in relation to other entities in the structure or system [...]. Logi-

cally, a function is a representation; it means a relation that assigns an element x attributed to a class M_1 to an element y attributed to a class M_2 . (1977: 42; my translation)⁶

We also want to use the basis of the particular case of most interest in our context, the “semantic function”:

[...] a *semantic function* indicates an element of a number of signs, and due to its relation to other entities in the text or its cultural contexts, it is attributed to one (or more) element y of a number of meanings. (Ibid.: 42-43; my translation)⁷

and

The relation of structures and functions are not essentially (necessarily) clear: One and the same structure can serve different functions in different systems; one and the same function can be served with diverse structures. The term function can also obviously be applied to different levels: The semantic function of a text entity is, for example, part of the semantic structure of this text, and this structure fulfills specific functions in the social practice of its culture. (Ibid.: 43; my translation)⁸

For Titzmann (1977: 352), the semantic function is

[...] the subset of a meaning or characteristics (used by and supporting a sign or culture system) of a term in a ‘text’ whose constituents are relevant and verifiable in this particular ‘text’ for at least one area. (My translation)⁹

6 Etwas hat eine Funktion, insofern es Teil (Element, Relation, Teilstruktur, Teilsystem) einer übergeordneten Struktur bzw. eines Systems ist, worin es eine bestimmte Position einnimmt, d.h. mit anderen Größen der Struktur/des Systems in bestimmten Relationen steht [...]. Logisch ist eine Funktion eine Abbildung, d.h. eine Relation, die Glieder x einer Klasse M_1 und Glieder y einer Klasse M_2 einander zuordnet. (Titzmann 1977: 42)

7 [...] eine semantische Funktion bedeutet, dass ihr als Glied einer Menge von Zeichen und aufgrund ihrer Relationen zu anderen Größen des Textes oder seines kulturellen Kontextes, eines (oder mehrere) der Glieder y einer Menge von Bedeutungen zugeordnet ist. (Titzmann 1977: 42-43)

8 *Die Relation von Strukturen und Funktionen ist nicht notwendig eineindeutig: ein und dieselbe Struktur kann in verschiedenen Systemen verschiedene Funktionen erfüllen; ein und dieselbe Funktion kann durch verschiedene Strukturen erfüllt werden. Auch der Begriff der Funktion kann natürlich auf verschiedenen Ebenen angewendet werden: die semantische Funktion einer Textgröße ist z.B. Teil der semantischen Struktur dieses Textes; diese ihrerseits erfüllt bestimmte Funktionen in der sozialen Praxis ihrer Kultur. (Titzmann 1977: 43)*

9 [...] die (Teil-) Menge der (durch das verwendete Zeichensystem oder durch die Kultur vorgegebenen oder kontextuell zugeordneten) Bedeutungen/Merkmale eines Terms in einem “Text”, deren Glieder in diesem “Text” für mindestens eine Stelle jeweils nachweisbar relevant sind. (Titzmann 1977: 352)

The detection of the change of functions implied the determination of ‘transformation’ that we can define in our context as an operation that connected a start structure with an end structure, and we have a large variety of possibilities of transformations, such as, for example, substitutions, or the representation of diverse parallel alternatives or variations. The transformation primarily has an effect on the new context without affecting the original context. However, it is also possible that, with the recodification of a pre-existing structure, in a new context the interpreter discovers new aspects, including for the interpretation of the preceding work (cf. Titzmann 1977: 43). In this sense ‘functions’ and ‘transformations’ are variable and changeable systems that depend on the passage of time and on change of space. The passing and change of time and space produce epistemological, cultural, historical, and social changes, as Borges in his text “Pierre Menard, author of Don Quixote” masterfully showed.

Under ‘*transculturality*’ we should understand the recourse to cultural models or fragments that belong to a different culture rather than to that of the point of departure of the media, which recourse builds a hybrid network of relations that are felt, but not considered as objects and products of a specific nation, nor of a single person. ‘*Transculturality*’ does not mean rootlessness or the elimination of the concept of place, not *Entortung*, but a de- and reterritorialization in multiple cultural places.

2.2 ‘Literarity’ and ‘Mediality’

In light of the different positions concerning both the relation between text and media and the diverse definitions of inter/transtextuality and inter/transmediality, I see a clear line of consensus: First, in the desire to avoid mixing the terminology of literary criticism with that of media research, for the simple reason that the two concepts have very different references and should use different theories and methods. As a consequence of it, I would like to introduce the terms ‘*literarity*’ and ‘*mediality*’. The first applies exclusively to literary texts (texts from different literary and dramatic genres that are treated as literature); literary phenomena like literary production, reception, and narrative strategies; inter/intra/transtextuality, etc. The second focuses on media structures (like theater, performance, flux, film, video, opera, fine art, all kinds of installations, etc.); media phenomena like media production, reception, media strategies and perception; as well as processes of inter/intra/transmediality, etc.

2.2.1 ‘Literarity’

Before we go into detail, I would like to make another fundamental differentiation: on the basis of Genette’s palimpsest model, we attribute to the term ‘*intertextuality*’ the quality or status of a *mimetic process* par excellence. Regardless of which intertextual form it takes (serious imitation, or through parody, travesty, etc.), it is always an *imitation* of the structure, part of the content of a ‘*pre-text*’, or both. This distinction is also valid for the term ‘*intermediality*’.

‘*Intertextuality*’ refers to all kinds of *mimetic external* relations between a text ‘A’, that we define as a ‘*post-text*’ or the base text, and a text ‘B’, that we define as a

‘pre-text’ or text of reference. The texts have either a ‘*hypotextual-relation*’ (a weak marked relation) or a ‘*hypertextual-relation*’ (a strong marked relation) (vid. A. de Toro 1992).

We reserve the concept of ‘*intratextuality*’ for a *mimetic internal* relation of *text segments in the text in process*. It is an *auto-referential dialogue* in the frame of the work of the same author: for example, when Borges places segments of text from preceding pages at the end of a story, or when an author pulls text segments or whole texts from his own literary production. Still the author, he restricts his activity with regard to the one text and to his whole body of work.

Let us now arrive at the central term of this part of my model. Under ‘*transtextuality*’, we understand an *anti-mimetic, rhizomatic* relation, because neither part of the content nor the structure of the ‘*post-text*’ are *imitated* from the ‘*pre-text*’. The point of reference is dissolved and dispersed either at the first contact point, or during the writing process. A monumental deconstructive dissemination takes place.

In this context, we must point out that the mere quotation of an author or work is not sufficient to constitute transtextuality in the sense in which Genette defines intertextuality. Then, in the case of our term of ‘*transtextuality*’, the ‘*pre-text*’ serves only as a point of departure in order to arrive at a completely different thing or case: The ‘*post-text*’ brings the ‘*pre-text*’ to a field that does not belong to the structure or context of the ‘*pre-text*’. One example is the reference to Johannes Valentinus Andreae, a 17th century theologian from Württemberg, to whom Borges, in his own short story “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”, attributes the work *Lesbare und lesenswerthe Bemerkungen über das Land Ukkbar in Klein-Asien (1641)*, a text that Borges invented. The information on the author, that really existed, becomes Borges reading De Quincey’s *Essay VIII*, in which he mentions a real text attributed to Andreae: *Chymische Hochzeit Christiani Rosencreutz anno 1459*. This work, one that Borges probably never read, and perhaps one that he only knew from De Quincey or from an encyclopedia, does not have any relation to Borges’ short story. The question here is: Why does Borges give Andreae such a prominent place in his short story when he does not go into a dialogue with the work itself? I found a possible solution to the enigma of this non-relation (A. de Toro 1992): The Inquisition brought Andreae to trial and put him in prison, claiming that his work was doctrinal heresy against the principles of the Holy Church. The Inquisition made a real, non-fictional text out of a fictional text, just as Cervantes, in his second volume of *Don Quixote*, transformed his two fictional heroes into real, historical persons, something that Borges admired his whole life. Thus did the imagination make a world out of literature and this is exactly what Borges makes in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”. He lets the objects of Tlön appear in the reality of the fiction. Tlön is a planet in the fantastic literature of Tlön, a literature that belongs to Uqbar, an unknown region that is quoted in *The Anglo-American Cyclopaedia*, invented by Borges. It is not Andreae’s text that fascinated Borges and that is imitated by him, but the theologian’s destiny, and the fact that fiction can create an empirical reality. This fascinating case is not part of the work of Andreae. Borges transcends intertextuality and moves to transtextuality, creating a completely new work *without reference*, a hypertext and a hyperfiction; he dissolves and disseminates Andreae’s ‘*pre-text*’ and produces, using

the terminology of Deleuze and Derrida (1972), folding, re-folding, grafting, supplement, and rhizome.

That is the first case of transtextuality. The second case, that will be relevant when we discuss the term 'transmediality' and come to the examples, is that in which Borges goes, intentionally or unintentionally, consciously or unconsciously, beyond the writing medium, creating or intuiting a new media system, that does not exist at the time.

2.2.2 'Mediality'

In the field of '*mediality*' we define '*intermediality*' as a *mimetic external process*, independent of the method of transfer, imitating another media structure or media content. Consequently, under '*intermediality*' we understand the relation between a Medium 'A', the '*post-medium*' (the base medium) and a medium 'B', the '*pre-medium*' (the reference medium). These can have a '*hypo-media*' (a weak marked relation) or a '*hyper-media*' relation (a strong marked relation) to each other.

The concept '*intramediality*' defines the *internal mimetic* relation either within a single media, or when a filmmaker or media artist takes media segments or whole media segments from his own media production; for example, when in their films, Robbe-Grillet, Godard, or Hitchcock continually quote preceding parts of the object (in the case of Robbe-Grillet, through serial-aleatoric processes). Here, the media producer stays within his own media work, and limits and restricts his activity to a single media object or to his own media work.

Now we come to the second main concept that I want to discuss here: '*transmediality*'. Mecke and Roloff, for example, define the concept of intermediality in a similar form to that in which I have defined my term '*transmediality*'. We understand since 2001 '*transmediality*' *first* as an *anti-mimetic process or strategy* in the sense of a hybrid, intensely charged relation (whether smooth, highly fricative, or tense) between different autonomously operating media (internet, video, film, different forms of communication, virtual cities and worlds, analogue and digital techniques, etc.), diverse aesthetics (such as Surrealism, Dadaism, Expressionism, etc.), but also mixed media (such as literature/internet, theater/video/film/installations), different products, preference cultures, art forms (painting, virtual design), or architecture.

A key element of the theory and practice of '*transmediality*' is that we do not have simply the case of syncretism of media or a mere juxtaposition or coexistence of diverse media. Rather, it is a) a hybrid phenomenon of *friction and tension*, b) an *aesthetic-operative concept*, c) a process in which the media involved each remain *autonomous and visible*, d) a process in which the reciprocal relation is *not functionalized or subordinate* to other media, e) a process that serves to *interrupt the fictional illusion*, and that also serves f) as a *metamedial function*, helping reveal the media processes and steer the attention of the spectator to the construction of the artefact (as, the two examples and Robbe-Grillet films, show very clear).

Departing from this minimal definition, media representations such as theater, film, video or painting, etc. are not *per se* heterogeneous and hybrid constructions because they use language, voice, movement, images, body, performance, and collage.

The original sense of such media as heterogeneous and hybrid is lost due habitualization. On the contrary: performative-transmedial representation forms display media *autonomy* and *friction* between the utilized media systems and strategies, and their meta-level. These are the instruments that keep hybridity and transgression going, that exhibit and make explicit the implied processes of construction. Thus is habitualization or automatization avoided (as we use to call these strategies in the tradition of the Russian Formalists).

3. Strategies of ‘Transmediality’ and ‘Transculturality’: Some Examples: The Transgression of the Media

Some examples of transmediality related to transculturality we find in literature: in Flaubert’s *L’Education sentimentale* and Borges’ short stories, “The Aleph” and “The Garden of Forking Paths”, Robbe-Grillet’s *Le Voyeur*, *La jalousie*, *La Maison de Rendez-vous*, *Pour une révolution à New York*; in Italo Calvino’s *Se una notte d’inverno un viaggiatore*; in the work of Robert Wilson in the 90s, called ‘spectacularity’ by all, like *Cosmopolitan greetings*, *Parzival auf der anderen Seite des Sees*, or *Black Rider*. But also in Frida Kahlo’s *Diario* and paintings,¹⁰ in Alejandro Tantanián’s *Carlos W. Saénz (1956-)* (2003) or the ‘pseudo-prosthesis-presentations’ of *Periférico de Objetos*, like *Variaciones sobre B...* (1991), *El hombre de arena* (1992), *Cámara Gesell* (1993), *Máquina Hamlet* (1995), *Zooedipou* (1998) or *Monteverdi método bélico* (2000).

In the following I want to go into detail about some cases to which you may react with skepticism, and to which I have referred above, directly and indirectly: Flaubert’s *L’Education sentimentale*, Borges’ short stories, “The Aleph” and “The Garden of Forking Paths”, and at the end, Alejandro Tantanián’s *Carlos W. Saénz (1956-)* (2003).


3.1 Flaubert’s *L’Education sentimentale* or the Anticipation of the Film

L’Education sentimentale was published in 1869. Let us first contextualize briefly the time in which this novel was published in relation to the development of the media and what it is possible for Flaubert to have known about the new media fields of photography techniques that anticipate the film. Even if the beginning of the film is dated by Thomas Alva Edison in 1891, and by the brothers Lumière in 1895, Flaubert knew the techniques and possibilities of photography on his own and through his friendship with Maxime Du Camp, with whom he made his trip to Egypt.


The first attempts at photography in 1826 by Joseph Nicéphore Niépce were followed in 1839 by Louis Daguerre’s *daguerreotype* process. Further progress was made by Talbotype in 1840 with the collotype process, in 1847 with Sergei Lvovich Levitsky’s portraits, and in 1851 by Frederick Scott Archer with the colloidal process. In 1855, Roger Fenton’s photographic techniques constituted enormous advances in

10 For Frida Kahlo’s transmedial and transcultural practices in her *Diario* and paintings, see A. de Toro (2007, 2008b, 2001, 2013).

just a few years, with the particular aim of producing vivid pictures. In 1832, Simon Stampfer and Joseph Plateau developed, independently of one another, the phenakistoscope or *Lebensrad*, meaning “life wheel”, which served to create the impression of moving pictures in the observer. He used the stroboscopic effect, as well as the flashing or pulsing light effect produced by an instrument in order to make a cyclically moving object appear to be stationary or moving slowly. It is also important that, in 1847, Sergei Lvovich Levitsky developed a technique to portray photos of a person in different poses and with different clothes. This lent static photography a particular dynamic. In 1868, one year before Flaubert published his novel, Louis Ducos du Hauron introduced the first color carbon print. In 1869, Eadweard Muybridge invented the first shutters. In 1878 he employed these to shoot moving pictures using 36 successive photo cameras, like the famous photo series of galloping horses:



Pictures 1-2: ©<http://www.google.de/search?q=Eadweard+Muybridge&hl=de&prmd=imvnsob&tbm=isch&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ei=EkelT82IHMtAatv6ycBQ&ved=0CIsBELAE&biw=1472&bih=705>, ©Eadweard Muybridge-Wikimedia [24/03/2016].



Picture 3: ©<http://www.google.de/search?q=Eadweard+Muybridge&hl=de&prmd=imvnsob&tbm=isc&tbo=u&source=univ&sa=X&ei=EkelT82IHMtAatv6ycBQ&ved=0CIsBELAE&biw=1472&bih=705>, ©Eadweard Muybridge-Wikimedia [24/03/2016].

From the moving pictures, film began its vertiginous history, developing very quickly in the last third of the 19th century.

It is also important to mention the publications by David Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* from 1739 and *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* from 1748, in which he develops a theory about the relation between the origins of ideas and associations and the production of images. This, in turn, helped formulate the first step for the language of the film, and Foucault's identification of dispositives as the main episteme of the 19th century, and as part of the archi-episteme "human being", and the history of seeing, after Benjamin (1983: I), as a monumental montage of quotations and sources that allow for the construction of a dynamic and nomadic history ("*von unten*").

We know that Flaubert used two techniques in order to build a visual perspective of static scene, a sort of motion picture. On one side we have a rhetorical technique that I would like to call 'narrative-telling', and on the other side, the technique of 'narrative-seeing'. Using the first one, he uses the discourse elliptically or indirectly ("*discours indirecte libre*" or "*erlebte Rede*") by which – as we know – a personage, here Frédéric Moreau, builds a communicative situation onto which he projects his own thoughts and feelings. Using the second technique, Flaubert brings Frédéric as the 'eye' through the narrator's narration, describing the diverse scenes that he observes. Frédéric is his 'medium', or reflector as Stanzel in his book *Typische Formen des Romans* (1964/⁶1972) called this Flaubertian narrative technique.¹¹ It has the function, in this case, of a '*human-photographic-lens*', or of a sort of '*human-film-camera*' that captures only the fragments that fall within its field of vision. Spacial deixis of movement and visual deixis of perception are the instruments by which Flaubert makes part of what is not just a literary narration or 'telling', but a '*seeing-vivid-showing*'.

I am well aware of the fact that I am using an improper and metaphorical terminology of the media field, as Rajewky should argue, because the photographic camera is not a physical part of the media intersection in the literary text, much less the film camera, that at that time did not yet exist. But are there not as well the film as the photo camera imitating the human eye and gaze? What is important, however, is not this, but that which Murray says of writers and philosophers who envision media decades before they actually appear:

The difference is not so much in what they describe as in their orientation to it. The humanists see the contradictions and limitations of the great systems of thought and it causes them to question the very project of systemized thinking. (2003: 4).

[...] more closely at the rich interplay of cultural practice and technical innovation". (Ibid. 5)
The engineers draw upon cultural metaphors and analogies to express the magnitude of the change, the shape of the as yet unseen medium. The storytellers and theorists build imaginary landscapes of information, writing stories and essays that later become blueprints for actual systems.

[...] Gradually, the braided collaboration gives rise to an emergent form, a new medium of human expression. (Ibid.)

11 "[...] das personale Medium, wie aus der Art der Optik einer Linse" (Stanzel 1964/⁶1972: 43) or "ein[e] Kamera" (ibid.: 47).

The two philosophers suggested a new model of textual organization to replace the ideologically suspect hierarchies of the old print-based world. [...] It was as if Deleuze and Guattari had dug beneath the forking path garden of Borges [...] and come up with an even more profound labyrinth, but one that offers the hope of knowability and a metaphor of healthy growth. The potato root system has no beginning, no end, and grows outward and inward at the same time. It forms a pattern familiar to computer scientists: a network with discrete interconnected nodes. Here was a way out of the pullulating paralysis, one that went beyond the subversion of all existing hierarchies. Here was a way of constructing something new. The humanist project of shredding culture had found a radical new pattern of meaning, a root system that offered a metaphor of growth and connection rather than rot and disassembly. (Murray 2003: 9)

As Borges does later, Flaubert knows very well that language has great limitations and is not able to capture reality, movement, and sensory perception. And with the formulation that we all know:

Ce qui me semble beau, ce que je voudrais faire, c'est un livre sur rien, un livre sans attache extérieure, qui se tiendrait de lui-même par la force interne de son style [...] un livre qui n'aurait presque pas de sujet ou du moins où le sujet serait presque invisible, si cela se peut. [...] il n'y a ni beaux, ni vilains sujets et [...] on pourra presque établir comme axiome, en se posant au point de vue de l'art pur, qu'il n'y en a aucun, le style étant à lui tout seul une manière absolue de voir les choses. (*Correspondance*: "Lettre à Louise Colet, 16 janvier 1852")

Flaubert arrives at the limit of what language can do, and compensates this lack by introducing the aforementioned deixis. This is certainly revolutionary, but I do not forget that this "media turn" means only that the aesthetic media have become one of the central aspects of philological research. From this point on, theater writing after Aristotle's *Poetic* is considered showing media. In fact, in opposition to Plato, Aristotle restored the importance of mimesis that forms a semiotic point of view, using the passage of reality through language as a perception/visual instrument in order to '*faire voir*'. Literature's struggle to show has always been a challenge to 'represent' something, and 'to represent' means a mediatic act to describe actions and situations as if they were playing out before our eyes, as if the action were life happening at the moment of the reading, particularly in the novel of the 19th century France. This is part of the episteme of the time in which the impressionist painting, photography, and film appear. We can assert that visual performativity it is inherent in the language of the narrative genres, not a strange phenomenon to them.

Like David Hume (in his philosophical writing) and Eadweard Muybridge (with his "motion photos") anticipate the film – and here we have consensus – so does Flaubert anticipate it in *Madame Bovary* and particularly in *L'Education sentimentale*. Flaubert is the main author and the master of the desire to '*faire voir*' in the 19th century, and the model for the modern novel of the 20th century.

Example Ia:**Flaubert's *L'Éducation sentimentale* :****PREMIERE PARTIE****Chapitre 1**

Le 15 septembre 1840, vers six heures du matin, *la Ville-de-Montereau*, près de partir, *fumait à gros tourbillons* devant le quai Saint-Bernard.

Des gens *arrivaient hors d'haleine*; des barriques, des câbles, des corbeilles de linge gênaient *la circulation*; les matelots ne répondaient à personne; on se heurtait; les colis montaient entre les deux tambours, et le tapage s'absorbait dans le *bruissement* de la vapeur, qui, s'échappant par des plaques de tôle, enveloppait tout d'une nuée blanchâtre, tandis que la cloche, à l'avant, tintait sans discontinuer.

Enfin le navire partit; et les deux berges, peuplées de magasins, de chantiers et d'usines, filèrent comme deux larges rubans que l'on déroule.

Un jeune homme de dix-huit ans, à longs cheveux et qui tenait un album sous son bras, restait auprès du gouvernail, immobile. A travers le brouillard, *il contemplait* des clochers, des édifices dont il ne savait pas les noms; puis il embrassa, dans un dernier coup d'œil, l'île Saint-Louis, la Cité, Notre-Dame; et bientôt, Paris disparaissant, il poussa un grand soupir.

M. Frédéric Moreau, nouvellement reçu bachelier, s'en retournait à Nogent-sur-Seine [...]

Le tumulte *s'apaisait*; tous avaient pris *leur place*; *quelques-uns, debout*, se chauffaient autour de la machine, et la cheminée crachait avec un râle lent et rythmique son panache de fumée noire; *des gouttelettes de rosée coulaient* sur les cuivres; *le pont tremblait sous une petite vibration intérieure*, et les deux roues, tournant rapidement, battaient l'eau.

La rivière était bordée par des grèves de sable. On rencontrait des trains de bois qui se mettaient à onduler sous le remous des vagues, ou bien, dans un bateau sans voiles, *un homme assis* pêchait; puis *les brumes errantes se fondirent*, *le soleil parut*, *la colline qui suivait à droite le cours de la Seine peu à peu s'abaissa*, et il en surgit une autre, plus proche, sur la rive opposée.

Des arbres la couronnaient parmi des maisons basses couvertes de toits à l'italienne. Elles avaient *des jardins en pente que divisaient des murs neufs, des grilles de fer, des gazons, des serres chaudes, et des vases de géraniums, espacés régulièrement sur des terrasses où l'on pouvait s'accouder*. [...]

Frédéric pensait à la chambre qu'il occuperait là-bas, au plan d'un drame, à des sujets de tableaux, à des passions futures.

[...] *il marchait* sur le pont à pas rapides; *il s'avança jusqu'au bout, du côté* de la cloche; – et, dans un cercle de passagers et de matelots, *il vit* un monsieur qui contait des galanteries à une paysanne, tout en lui maniant la croix d'or qu'elle portait sur la poitrine. [...]

La présence de Frédéric ne le déranger pas. *Il se tourna* vers lui plusieurs fois, en l'interpellant par des *clins d'œil*; ensuite il offrit des cigares à tous ceux qui l'entouraient. Mais, ennuyé de cette compagnie, sans doute, il alla se mettre plus loin. Frédéric le suivit. [...]

Le soleil dardait d'aplomb, en *faisant reluire les gabillots* de fer autour des mâts, les plaques du bastingage et la surface de l'eau; [...]

Ce fut comme une apparition: Elle *était assise*, au milieu du banc, toute seule; ou du moins *il ne distingua* personne, dans *l'éblouissement* que lui envoyèrent ses yeux. En

même temps *qu'il passait, elle leva la tête; il fléchit involontairement les épaules; et, quand il se fut mis plus loin, du même côté, il la regarda.*

[...] Comme elle gardait la même attitude, *il fit plusieurs tours de droite et de gauche pour dissimuler sa manœuvre; puis il se planta tout près de son ombrelle, posée contre le banc, et il affectait d'observer une chaloupe sur la rivière.* (Flaubert 1869/1964: 1-8)

Example Ib:

Le lendemain, comme il se rendait chez Deslauriers au détour de la rue Vivienne et du boulevard, Madame Arnoux se montra devant lui, face à face. *Leur premier mouvement fut de reculer;* puis, le même sourire leur vint aux lèvres, et ils s'abordèrent. Pendant une minute, aucun des deux ne parla.

Le soleil l'entourait; et sa figure ovale, ses longs sourcils, son châle de dentelle noire, moulant la forme de ses épaules, sa robe de soie gorge-de-pigeon, le bouquet de violettes au coin de sa capote, tout lui parut, d'une splendeur extraordinaire. Une suavité infinie *s'épanchait de ses beaux yeux;* et, balbutiant, au hasard, les premières paroles venues:

- Comment se porte Arnoux?, dit Frédéric.
- Je vous remercie!
- Et vos enfants?
- Ils vont très bien!
- Ah!... ah ! Quel beau temps nous avons, n'est-ce pas?
- Magnifique, c'est vrai!
- Vous faites des courses?
- Oui.
- Et avec une lente inclination de tête:
- Adieu!

Elle ne lui avait pas tendu la main, n'avait pas dit un seul mot affectueux ne l'avait même pas invité à venir chez elle, n'importe! il n'eût point donné cette rencontre pour la plus belle des aventures, et il en ruminait la douceur tout en continuant sa route. (Flaubert 1869/1964: 261)

Example Ic:

Frédéric fut d'abord *ébloui par les lumières;* il *n'aperçut* que de la soie, du velours, des épaules nues, *une masse de couleurs qui se balançait* aux sons d'un orchestre *caché par des verdure*s, entre des murailles tendues de soie jaune, avec des portraits au pastel, *ça et là,* et des torchères de cristal en style Louis XVI. De hautes lampes, dont les globes dépolis ressemblaient à des boules de neige, dominaient des corbeilles de fleurs, posées sur des consoles *dans les coins;* et, *en face, après une seconde pièce* plus petite, on distinguait, *dans une troisième,* un lit à colonnes torsées, ayant une glace de Venise à son chevet.

[...]

Frédéric, s'étant *rangé contre le mur,* regarda le quadrille devant lui.

[...]

Frédéric, en *regardant* ces personnes, éprouvait un sentiment d'abandon, un malaise. Il songeait encore à Mme Arnoux et il lui semblait participer à quelque chose d'hostile se tramant contre elle. (Flaubert 1869/1964: 114)

Throughout the text, we have an obvious redundancy of space and perception deixis that steers the attention of the reader not to the action, which is minimal and insigni-

ficant, but to the movement, to the visual, to sensual acts such as hearing, smelling, touching, and to Frédéric's theater project that is continuously placed in middle of the narration in order to underline its perspectivation. We want to systematize the examples:

The Reflector:

Un jeune homme de dix-huit ans/il contemplait des clochers, des édifices dont il ne savait pas les noms; puis il embrassa, dans un dernier coup d'œil, l'île Saint-Louis, la Cité, Notre-Dame; et bientôt, Paris disparaissant
M. Frédéric Moreau, nouvellement reçu bachelier, s'en retournait à Nogent-sur-Seine
Frédéric pensait
La présence de Frédéric ne le déranger pas.

In example Ia, we have explicit space deixis:

fumait à gros tourbillons *devant* le quai Saint-Bernard
 Des gens *arrivaient* hors d'haleine
 des barriques, des câbles, des corbeilles de linge gênaient la *circulation*
entre les deux tambours, et le tapage s'absorbait dans le bruissement de la vapeur, qui,
s'échappant par des plaques de tôle, enveloppait tout d'une nuée blanchâtre
 Le tumulte *s'apaisait*
 tous avaient pris *leur place* ; quelques-uns, debout, se chauffaient autour de la machine
 La *rivière était bordée* par des grèves de sable.
il marchait sur le pont à pas rapides ; *il s'avança* jusqu'au bout, du côté de la cloche ;

perception deixis follows:

des gouttelettes de rosée *coulaient* sur les cuivres
il vit un monsieur qui contait des galanteries à une paysanne
Il se tourna vers lui plusieurs fois, en l'interpellant par *des clins d'œil*

and then we see space and perception deixis mixed:

[...] puis les brumes errantes se fondirent, le soleil parut, la colline qui suivait à droite le cours de la Seine peu à peu s'abaissa, et il en surgit une autre, plus proche, sur la rive opposée.

Elles avaient des jardins en pente que divisaient des murs neufs, des grilles de fer, des gazons, des serres chaudes, et des vases de géraniums, espacés régulièrement sur des terrasses où l'on pouvait s'accouder.

Le soleil dardait d'aplomb, en faisant reluire les gabillots de fer autour des mâts, les plaques du bastingage et la surface de l'eau;

Ce fut comme une apparition [de Mme Arneaux]:

Elle était assise, au milieu du banc, toute seule; ou du moins il ne distingua personne, dans l'éblouissement que lui envoyèrent ses yeux. En même temps qu'il passait, elle leva la tête; il fléchit involontairement les épaules: et, quand il se fut mis plus loin, du même côté, il la regarda.

Comme elle gardait la même attitude, il fit plusieurs tours de droite et de gauche pour dissimuler sa manœuvre; puis il se planta tout près de son ombrelle, posée contre le banc, et il affectait d'observer une chaloupe sur la rivière.

the body-sensual deixis:

le pont tremblait sous une petite vibration intérieure, et les deux roues, tournant rapidement, battaient l'eau.

In example Ib, we have space deixis:

Leur premier mouvement fut de reculer

and perception deixis:

Le soleil l'entourait; et sa figure ovale, ses longs sourcils, son châle de dentelle [...]

In example Ic, we have the alternative deixis of perception and space:

Frédéric fut d'abord *ébloui par les lumières*; il *n'aperçut* que de la soie, du velours, des épaules nues, *une masse de couleurs qui se balançait* aux sons d'un orchestre *caché par des verdure*s, entre des murailles tendues de soie jaune, avec des portraits au pastel, *ça et là*, et des torchères de cristal en style Louis XVI.

the space deixis:

des corbeilles de fleurs, posées sur des consoles *dans les coins*; et, *en face*, après une *seconde pièce* plus petite, on distinguait, *dans une troisième*, un lit à colonnes torses, ayant une glace de Venise à son chevet.

Frédéric, s'étant *rangé contre le mur*, regarda le quadrille devant lui.

perception deixis:

Frédéric, en *regardant* ces personnes.

In example Ia, we have a focus that changes from a long shot to a close-up narrative shooting, from a panoramic perspective to a single, individualizing perspective with many details: Frédéric looks to the quay, to the ship and the masses of people moving past and boarding. The perspective is then connected expressively with the eye of Frédéric, that prologues the narrative zooming, but now individualizes some passengers and part of the boat, switching the thoughts and feelings of Frédéric ("*Frédéric pensait à la chambre qu'il occuperait là-bas, au plan d'un drame, à des sujets de tableaux, à des passions futures*" [...]). The object of a total individualization and focused personage by the pseudo-reflector-camera-eye-Frédéric is Mme. Arnoux, whom Frédéric perceives as an "*apparition*".

This scene is constructed similarly to example Ib, in which Frédéric unexpectedly meets Mme. Arnoux in the street: Here we also have a total focalization, and the content of the scene can be more banal and insignificant, as Frédéric himself says: "Elle ne lui avait pas tendu la main, n'avait pas dit un seul mot affectueux ne l'avait même pas invité à venir chez elle, n'importe! il n'eût point donnée cette rencontre pour la plus belle des aventures [...]."

This scene has some terms of perception in common with those from example Ic, as Frédéric enters the ballroom and is dazzled by the lights in the room: “Frédéric fut d’abord ébloui par les lumières ; il n’aperçut”.

This kind of writing, with a strong performative *gestus* and deixis throughout, we want to call ‘performative-writing’: the announcement and anticipation of the film.

But we have, at the same time, an act of ‘*transtermediality*’ because, in arriving at the limit of language’s power of representation, Flaubert transgresses the context of language and writing. The concentration and iteration of deixis of space and perception throughout the novel can be interpreted as a desperate effort on the part of Flaubert to transform narrative pictures into visual pictures. This repetition also has a metatextual and metamediatic function: The impossibility of writing in order to produce moving pictures marks the interface of the textual semiotic and an upcoming, then unknown media: the film.

3.2 Borges’ “The Aleph”, “The Garden of Forking paths”: From Representation to the Presence of the Creation of Media ‘Hyperworlds’ and ‘Many-Worlds’

Example IIa: The Web

I come now to the ineffable center of my tale; it is here that a writer’s hopelessness begins. Every language is an alphabet of symbols the employment of which assumes a past shared by its interlocutors. How can one transmit to others the infinite Aleph, which timorous memory can scarcely contain? [...] Perhaps the gods would not deny me the discovery of an equivalent image, but then this report would be polluted with literature, with falseness. And besides, the central problem – the enumeration, even partial enumeration, of infinity – is irresolvable.

In that unbounded moment, I saw millions of delightful and horrible acts; none amazed me so much as the fact that all occupied the same point, without superposition and without transparency. What my eyes saw was simultaneous; what I shall write is successive, because language is successive. Something of it, though, I will capture.

Under the step, toward the right, I saw a small iridescent sphere of almost unbearable brightness. At first I thought it was spinning; then I realized that the movement was an illusion produced by the dizzying spectacles inside it. The Aleph was probably two or three centimeters in diameter, but universal space was contained inside it, with no diminution in size. Each thing [...] was infinite things, because I could clearly see it from every point in the cosmos. (“The Aleph”, Borges 1998: 129ff.)

Borges, the narrator, affirms in the context of our argumentation, three important aspects:

- a) Not only is it impossible for language to imitate simultaneity, even if simultaneity implies the notion of delimited time and space, but, beyond this fact, it cannot describe something that does not have boundaries in space and time. Where notions like time and space, right or left, up and down mean anything, one is seeing an infinite universe: “without superposition and without transparency”/“the enumeration, even partial enumeration, of infinity”, an idea, by the way, that we also

find in the “Book of Sand”: “He told me his book was called the book of Sand because neither sand nor this book has a beginning or an end”. (“The Book of Sand”, Borges 2007: 91)


- b) Language cannot describe a rhizomatic virtual simultaneous world where all objects and phenomenons are existing at the same time, simply because of its causal and successive syntax “I shall write is successive, because language is successive”, and the reduction of the seeing to a linear and hierarchical structure will destroy the “transparency” of the observed Aleph: “but then this report would be polluted with literature, with falseness”.
- c) Probably the most important enunciation for the transgression of the literature is that, in the context of language writing, the “problem” means creating another medium, another world, for which there is no solution: “And besides, the central problem [...] is irresolvable”. What most astonishes the narrator are not the objects and phenomena he sees, *but* the way in which the seen world is constructed, the place or non-place that the objects, the people, the events, etc. occupied in the Aleph: “In that un-bounded moment, I saw millions of delightful and horrible acts; none amazed me so much as the fact that all occupied the same point, without superposition and without transparency”.

The structure of the world that he sees transgresses all experiences, particularly those performed and constructed by language. In this moment, Borges becomes conscious that language has a true medial or mediatization limitation, and he evokes another, virtual world when he speaks of a world without “superposition” and “transparency”. These terms are part of the general theory of post-quantum physics, of Everett, and of the following interpretation by DeWitt (1970), and reproduce the idea of a “splitting” world.

The questions that the reader asks himself are which world Borges has in mind, and how he can realize it. Today, the answer is: the Web and the “many-worlds theory”. And of course, even that Web is an analogy and a metaphor, because while the world that Borges is creating is really infinite and founded in “uncertainty”, the Web is an infinite-finite world based on a binary structure. Borges, on the contrary, has a radical hypertext in mind: “The line consists of an infinite number of points; the plane, of an infinite numbers of lines; the volume, of an infinite numbers of planes; the hypervolume, of an infinite numbers of volumes...” (“The Book of Sand”, Borges 2007: 89)

The world that Borges predicts is the ‘Hyperworld’, which is constructed on the system of ‘hypertetality’ (Nelson 1965/2003, 1974/2003) or ‘hypermedality’, and the term “hypervolume” with the reference to infinitude is a more than clear indication.

And once more: It is not important that “The engineers” are not working with the artifact itself, that they are working with “cultural metaphors and analogies”, important is only that through all that they are capable of changing the world, “to express the magnitude of the change, the shape of the as yet unseen medium”. And these “imaginary landscapes of information, writing stories and essays” that “storytellers and theorists” are building become, much later, “blueprints for actual systems”.



Picture 4: ©Wardrip-Fruin, Noah/Montfort, Nick (eds.) (2003).
The New Media Reader. Cambridge (Mass.)/
 London: MIT Press.

Example IIb: ‘Many Worlds’

In all fiction, when a man is faced with alternatives he chooses one at the expense of the others. In the almost unfathomable *Ts'ui Pên*, he chooses – simultaneously – all of them. He thus *creates* various futures, various times which start others that will in their turn branch out and bifurcate in other times. [...]

In *Ts'ui Pên's* work, all the possible solutions occur, each one being the point of departure for other bifurcations. Sometimes the pathways of this labyrinth converge. For example, you come to this house; but in other possible pasts you are my enemy; in others my friend. [...]

He believed in an infinite series of times, in a dizzily growing, ever spreading network of diverging, converging and parallel times. This web of time - the strands of which approach one another, bifurcate, intersect or ignore each other through the centuries – embraces every possibility.


“In all of them,” I enunciated, with a tremor in my voice. “I deeply appreciate and am grateful to you for the restoration of *Ts'ui Pen's* garden.”

“Not in all,” he murmured with a smile. “Time is forever dividing itself toward innumerable futures and in one of them I am your enemy.” (Jorge Luis Borges: “The Garden of Forking Paths”: 75-77)


The many worlds of Borges are those

[...] that denies the existence of a separate classical realm and asserts that it makes sense to talk about a state vector for the whole universe”. (DeWitt/Graham 1973: v)

[...] continual splitting of the universe into a multitude of mutually unobservable, but yielded a definite result and in most of which the familiar statistical quantum laws hold. (Ibid.).



Later on, I drew in another text that I received shortly before I finished my book *Borges infinito. Borgesvirtual 2008*, entitled *Hyperspace*. It was published in 1994 by the famous theoretical physicist of the City College of New York, Michio Kaku, the founder of the *string field theory*:



Picture 5: ©Michio Kaku (1994/2019). *Hyperspace. A Scientific Odyssey through the 10th Dimension*. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Kaku writes:

In 1957, physicist Hugh Everett raised the possibility that during the evolution of the universe, it continually “split” in half, like a fork in a road. In one universe, the uranium atom did not disintegrate and the cat was not shot. In the other, the uranium atom did disintegrate and the cat was shot. If Everett is correct, there are an infinite number of universes. Each universe is linked to every other through the network of forks in the road. Or, as the Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges wrote in *The Garden of Forking Paths*, “time forks perpetually toward innumerable futures” (1994: 262).

This statement of Kaku confirms our interpretation of the transmedial capacity of Borges' writing and Fictions.

In 1968, Deleuze discovered Borges' powerful idea of an infinite expanding world, an idea he denominated "rhizom" in the 70s and 80s, quoting Borges' passages from "The Garden of Forking Paths" word by word:


Sur ce jeu la différence et de la répétition, en tant que mené par l'instinct de mort, nul n'est allé plus loin que Borges, dans toute son œuvre insolite : « si la loterie est une intensification du hasard, une infusion périodique du chaos dans le cosmos, ne conviendrait-il pas que le hasard intervînt dans toutes les étapes du tirage et non point dans une seule ? N'est-il pas évidemment absurde que le hasard dicte la mort de quelqu'un, mais que ne soient pas sujettes au hasard les circonstances de cette mort : la réserve, la publicité, le délai d'une heure ou d'un siècle ? ... En réalité *le nombre des tirages est infini*. Aucune décision n'est finale, toutes se ramifient. Les ignorants supposent que d'infinis tirages nécessitent un temps infini ; il suffit en fait que le temps soit infiniment subdivisible... Dans toutes les fictions, chaque fois que diverses solutions se présentent, l'homme en adopte une et élimine les autres ; dans la fiction du presque inextricable *Ts'ui Pên*, il les adopte tous – simultanément. Il *crée* ainsi divers avenir, divers temps qui prolifèrent aussi et bifurquent. De là, les contradictions du roman. Fang par exemple détient un secret ; un inconnu frappe à sa porte ; Fang décide de le tuer. Naturellement, il y a plusieurs dénouements possibles : Fang peut tuer l'intrus, l'intrus peut tuer Fang, tous deux peuvent rattraper, tous deux peuvent mourir, etc. Dans l'ouvrage *Ts'ui Pên*, tous les dénouements se produisent ; chacun est le point de départ d'autres bifurcation. (Deleuze 1968: 152/153)

The case of Borges is not only one that has to be contextualized in transmediality phenomena, but also in the development of transculturality and in my senses of these terms: first, he must be considered as someone that – in the works referred here – dialogs not only with an Argentinean or Latin American literary, cultural, or scientific tradition, but at the same time with the European tradition. In "Tlön Uqbar, Orbis Tertius" he is dealing with Johannes Valentinus Andrea via De Quincey's essay about him, and with the literary traditions of Paracelsus and in dialogue with theorems coming from philosophy, particularly from the natural and exact sciences, that allowed him to develop a completely new concept of 'text', 'literature', and of virtual literature and world (and no longer of a traditional mimetic fantastic literature. Transcending his usual cultural borders, he creates new cultural spaces and knowledge systems, as we have described. His literature can be understood as deterritorialized in both senses: the media change genres, from literature to media and physics, and from local to global culture.

3.3 Jürgen Meier's Architecture-, Art-, Light- and Performance-Virtual Installations

A light installation of a virtual word (a street where cars and streetcars drive by and people walk) is projected onto the facade of a shopping center in Hamburg ("Lust for Life", Hamburg's Mönckeberg-Passage) or onto the Siemens' offices in Berlin as a "virtual surface". Some of these installations are installed online in order to be inter-

active, so that surfers can change the color scheme (color intensity, and speed of the color change) as well as the order of passing cars and people.



Pictures 6-7: ©Jürgen Meier: www.medienfueralles.de.

Different systems, physical means of generating and changing light, processes, media technology, aesthetics and an artistic and philosophical concept: all these come together to make a purely virtual world that raises questions of perception of social behavior, of art, architecture, and design. The borders of these traditionally separate areas are opened in a kind of rhizome (Deleuze/Guattari 1976).

The hybridization takes place on both the object level (dialogue between media/systems of signs/fields) and on the level of discipline (object analysis requiring background knowledge of the field from which the objects originate).



Picture 8: Administrative building of the VEAG, Berlin
Chausseestraße 23, ©Jürgen Meier: www.medienfueralles.de.

In the three examples I have just listed, Meier projected a “virtual surface” where the interaction of lights and colors created a real landscape, alight with colors of different intensities and speeds, and different orders of appearance, produced by a computer. The viewer could also arbitrarily alter the structure of this surface with his own computer.

The diverse systems and physical methods of producing and refracting light, the artistic, medial, aesthetic, and philosophical processes create that which Meier calls a

“light climate” (“Lichtklima”) or a “digital skin” (“digitale Haut”). The borders that traditionally separate these areas are traversed by a rhizomatic or hybrid process of construction. The hybridization occurs both between the different artistic areas and between the different disciplines.

3.5 Alejandro Tantanián’s ‘Performance-Installations’, ‘Objectality’, ‘Virtuality’, and ‘Hyperreality’: *Carlos W. Sáenz 1956*

Carlos W. Sáenz 1956 was performed in 2003 at the Art Festival des Arts in Brussels, and then in Frankfurt, Berlin, Stuttgart, and Bergen. It is a Borgesian work, using speeches in order to create an imaginary character, in the context of which objects begin to appear that are connected with his mysterious life, that of an autistic and melancholic philanthropist. There is even an e-mail address, and the discourse on his life and biography branches out like a rhizome. The various stories are born of one another, forking and intersecting, surpassing each other and branching out. The story is set in Buenos Aires on Maza Street.

It is a spectacle of “installations” in which four participants make up the presentation. This space is located behind the scenery itself, it is rectangular, to the left and right are benches for the audience. At the forefront, we have Tantanián, who reads Sáenz’s story in English (with some fragments in Spanish) as in a university lecture hall. A transparency projector, a power-point presentation, various video projections and film sequences are used to illustrate the lecture. To his left stands a commentator reading texts in German, Dutch and other languages.



Pictures 9-10: ©Alfonso de Toro/Tantanián (2003).

In front of Tantanián, at the other end of the space, are instruments for playing live music, and in one corner there is another commentator speaking in French.



Picture 11-12: ©Alfonso de Toro/Tantanián (2003).

The center, like a type of corridor, contains cables that reel through a series of objects.



Picture 13: ©Alfonso de Toro/Tantanián (2003).


In the room adjacent to the spectacle space are display cases containing objects owned by Carlos W. Sáenz: a tobacco pouch, maps, books, a walking stick, etc.

Carlos W. Sáenz was born on a night of turmoil in Buenos Aires in 1956, and mysteriously disappeared on another night of turmoil in 1985. Macchi, Rudnitzky and Tantanián accidentally discover his work in Macchi's new studio on Maza Street, one that used to belong to Sáenz. There, they discover a box of Sáenz's maps and drawings. This material drives them to begin an investigation, the result of which is the spectacle that is being watched, Tantanián speaks:

Good evening.

Little is known about Carlos W. Sáenz after his disappearance one stormy night in 1985. He left some traces, some names, and an enigma.

At the center we see the floor plan of Sáenz's theater of melancholy, and a drawing of the building and its location:




Picture 14: ©Alfonso de Toro/Tantanián (2003).

Sáenz's childhood is described: how his father dies, crushed by Augusto Pérez Díez de Mendoza, a national hero – a character just as imaginary as Sáenz, who makes his career in the military but is a hermaphrodite and avid cross-dresser. He is also the father of a miracle child and daughter of a tyrant, another invention. Sáenz and Pérez Díez are united by fragility, outsider status and melancholy.

The work is 'transmedial' in that it employs diverse methods that maintain its autonomy and are not always functions of one another. There is always transmediality, including when different medial elements occur within one aesthetic concept, when they constitute the multimedial implementation of elements and processes, or when these take the form of quotations; that is to say, when a dialogue of medial elements is created and a medial metatext is produced.

When, for example, the film *La Passion de Jeanne D'Arc* is projected, another video is projected in which cries are heard, mixed with interviews with Carlos W. Sáenz.



Picture 15: ©Alfonso de Toro/Tantanián (2003).

The objects, photographs, paintings and drawings that move along the cords through the center space construct a virtual reality at the moment in which they are presented, and only exist during that moment.



Picture 16: ©Alfonso de Toro/Tantanián (2003).

With the objects from Carlos W. Sáenz's life, Sáenz is created, and creates a reality for others with his interviews and maps. The objects, words, images, lighting and sounds invade the world of the spectator, connecting the past to the present, and making up the present and the future. Sáenz creates Augusto Pérez Díez, but he soon becomes reality: one of the speakers passes a postcard with a picture of the hero into the audience:



Picture 17-18: ©Alfonso de Toro/Tantanián (2003).

There are no actors, but speakers, or 'agents' as in the work of PO. The real characters are the objects, the sounds and the lighting, and particularly the spectacle space.

The transmedial structure of the work and its indefinable status (academic lecture, virtualization of reality, fiction, poetry, metaspectacularity, etc.) make it a highly hybrid construct that transcends genre, style, tradition and type, and ultimately has a hyperreal character, understood as a replacement of the real by the virtual. The barriers between author, dramaturge and actor are overcome; between inside and outside, between reality and fiction, between representation and theater, between spectacle space and audience space.

This ambiguity is heightened by the tour of the exhibition of objects from Sáenz's box:



Picture 19: ©Alfonso de Toro/Tantanian (2003).



Picture 20-21: ©Alfonso de Toro/Tantanian (2003).

4. Conclusion

The works I have briefly described represent a paradigm shift within the different arts and in the history of media, literature, and culture research. They all involve revolutionary changes and perlaborations, the overcoming of epistemologies, genres, and works, whether they are works of theater, poetry, or literature. We have analyzed terms like ‘narrative fiction’ (in the case of Flaubert and Borges) and philosophical processes create by a “light climate” (“Lichtklima”) or a “digital skin” (“digitale Haut”) (in the case of Jürgen Meier), and ‘performance-installations’, ‘objectality’, ‘virtuality’, and ‘hyperreality’ (in the case of Tantanián). These examples quite clearly illustrate that the concept of ‘transmediality’ which always indicates a transgression and transcendence of the medial location of departure. Therefore, it is also an epistemological deterritorialization of traditional forms of representation and performance, due to radical changes to concepts such as subject, perception, seeing, reality, representation, theater, play, actor, and so on. For this reason, ‘transmediality’ is not primarily a strategy of the production of significance, but one of dissemination and emancipation. It gives cause for reflection on the artifact as film, theater, painting, or text; and on the potential to transgress borders. ‘Transmediality’ as part of hybrid and translation pro-

cesses also represents a cultural transgression, as in our example from Borges. Some of these works, in particular Borges' work, demonstrate what we have called 'transculturality', strategy that re-codified, re-functionalized and re-invented structures coming from other cultures. We see a dissemination of meaning, with a nomadic and rhizomatic trail that deterritorializes and reterritorializes cultures and objects in space and time, and that avoids cultural essentialism.

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